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CASE NOTES
Anti-Trust Laws - Fair Trade - Resale Price-Fixing Between Mlanu-
facturer-Wholesaler and Other Wholesalers.-The Government brought an
action for injunctive relief under section 4 of the Sherman Act against the de-
fendant, charging illegality of its "fair trade" agreements with independent
wholesalers, with whom it was in competition, under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Defendant claimed that the contracts were exempt from the Sherman Act
by the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act. Defendant was a corporation
operating as a drug wholesaler through 74 wholesale divisions, located in 35
states, and sold drug store merchandise of various brands to retailers throughout
the nation. It also manufactured its own brand-named products and distributed
them directly to retailers as well as through independent wholesalers. Most of
its sales to independent wholesalers were made by its manufacturing division.
Although the manufacturing and wholesale divisions had separate headquarters,
they were not separately incorporated and were component parts of the -ame
corporation. Defendant's manufacturing division entered into "fair trade" agree-
ments with other independent wholesalers, who bought from its manufacturing
division, fixing the resale prices of defendant's products. The District Court
denied the injunction and held that price-fixing agreements between a manu-
facturer who is also a wholesaler and competing wholesalers are not illegal per
se. On appeal to the Supreme Court, three justices dissenting, held reversed.
Price maintenance contracts between a manufacturer-wholesaler and another
wholesaler in competition with each other were not exempt from illegality under
the liller-Tydings Act. United States v. McKcsson and Robbins, Inc., 351
U.S. 305 (1956).
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act' provides that agreements in restraint of trade
are illegal. Price-fixing agreements (whether "horizontal" or "vertical") as a
general rule have been held "per se" as unreasonable restraint of trade.2 In 1937
the Miller-Tydings Act3 legalized price maintenance agreements prescribing mini-
mum prices for resale of branded or trade-marked goods when such contracts are
lawful under the state laws and the commodities are sold competitively with
other similar brand merchandise. It did not, however, legalize such agree-
ments" . . . between manufacturers, ... or bctwecn wholesalcrs, . .. or be-
tween retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with
each other."4 When read as a whole, the statute is seen to validate the manu-
1. 15 U.S.CA. § 1 (1951). Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination ..., or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or vith foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal... 2'
2. Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F2d 646 (1944), cert. deicd,
323 U.S. 726 (1944); United States v. Food and Grocery Bureau of So. Cal., Inc., 43 F.
Supp. 974 (1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d 973 (1943); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Dr. ils
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
3. 15 U.S.CA. § 1 (1951).
4. Emphasis added.
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facturer's "fair trade" contracts when made "vertically" down the channels of
distribution of the brand merchandise, as distinguished from "horizontal" con-
tracts, made between manufacturers of different products or between contracts
made between wholesalers of the same product not produced by any of them.
However, the majority of the Court felt that fair trade contracts between a
manufacturer of competitive brand-named merchandise and independent whole-
salers of that merchandise, otherwise concededly legal under the Miller-Tydings
Act, were rendered illegal when the manufacturer also functioned as a wholesaler
in competition with the independent wholesalers. The Court refused to examine
legislative history because it felt that the language of the statute exempting the
legality of fair trade agreements "between wholesalers" or "between corporations
in competition" is clear and unambiguous, and held that since the defendant was
a wholesaler and competed at the same functional level with other wholesalers its
agreements with these wholesalers are prevented from falling within the statutory
exemption.
The Court also refused to consider whether the defendant made the contracts
in question in its capacity as a manufacturer rather than as a wholesaler. The
Court held that the issue was decided by the fact that the contracting parties
were wholesalers and were competing with each other, taking the words of the
statutes in their "normal and customary meaning."5,
The dissent contended that the agreements were legal under the Miller-Tydings
Act because the intention of the legislation was to allow the manufacturer of a
brand-named product to protect the good will his name enjoys by controlling
the prices at which his products are resold.
Granting the majority's assertion that the proviso in question is unambiguous
and upon its face susceptible only of one construction, the Court still should have
inquired into the legislative history since when the plain meaning produces
absurd or unreasonable results the Court may look to the underlying policy of
the legislation as a whole. The Supreme Court has said: "When aid to construc-
tion of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly
can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use however clear the words may appear
on superficial examination." 6
The instant case is the first Supreme Court decision construing the proviso in
the Miller-Tydings Act regarding exemption from illegality of agreements made
by an integrated manufacturer. The decision's effect on common business prac-
tice will be intense. It has produced an unreasonable result not contemplated by
the legislature. The Court's construction, for example, will not allow a manu-
facturer of shoes to enter into fair trade contracts with an independent whole-
saler of shoes fixing the minimum resale price of its brand-named shoes for the
reason that the manufacturer and the wholesaler also happen to operate their
own book stores, because they would be "retailers" or "persons, firms, or corpo-
rations in competition" on the same functional level.
5. The Court refers to Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
In that case the Court held that the Miller-Tydings Act is unambiguous and applied the
"plain meaning" rule. But in that case the Court dealt with a completely different question,
that is, whether or not a "non-signer" provision can be read into the Act. 341 U.S. at 388.
6. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543, 544 (1940).
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An inquiry into the legislative history to determine proper construction would
therefore have been appropriate. It seems clear enough that the purpose of the
legislation was the protection of the good will of the manufacturer by permitting
him to maintain resale prices on his competitive brand-named merchandise. The
Miller-Tydings Act was enacted shortly after the Old Dearborn Distributing
Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.7 decision. In that case the Supreme Court sus-
tained the constitutionality of state legislation which authorized resale price
maintenance contracts. It found the purpose of such legislation to be the pro-
tection of the producer's good will, and emphasized the importance of the good
will as the most valuable asset of the producer or distributor of commodities 8
The proviso in the Miller-Tydings Act carried over the provisions of state
laws, but added the words, "brokers" and "factors" and the general phrase,
"persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other." The legislative
history of the Miller-Tydings Act as traced in both committee reports seems to
confirm the interpretation that, in the spirit of Old Dearborn, a manufacturer
should not be denied fair trade protection of his own competitive brand products
at the wholesale level simply because he also distributes such products through
his own outlets. The legislation renders its own definition of competition, that
the commodity must be sold competitively with other similar brand merchandise.
The House Committee Report recommending the bill explains: "The trade acts
referred to legalize the maintenance of contracts, of resale prices of branded or
trade-marked goods which are in free competition with other goods of the same
general class."'1 It is significant that the report refers to the Old Dearborn case.
The committee must have been aware that the purpose of state fair trade legisla-
tion was to protect the good will of the manufacturer. Therefore it would seem
clear that the purpose of the Mlller-Tydings Act was to enable the state fair
trade laws to be operative in interstate commerce.
Furthermore, the Senate Committee Report explicitly states that the bill does
no more than to remove federal obstacles to the enforcement of contracts which
the states themselves have declared lawful. 1 Finally, Senator Tydings, the spon-
sor of the bill, made the following statement: "What we have attempted to do is
what 42 States have already written on their statute books. It is simply to back
up those acts, . . . that is all. . , ' The strong inference that Congress in-
tended to protect the good will of the producer is further strengthened by the
fact that Congress permitted price maintenance contracts and resale price en-
forcement even against "non-signers" by passing the McGuire Act'3 and thus
7. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
S. Id. at 194, 195.
9. S. Rep. No. 2053, 7th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936); H. R. Rep. No. 382, 75th Cong, 1st
Sess. (1937); S. Rep. No. S78, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) recommending the enactment of
title VIII of H. R. 7472 which finally became the Miller-Tydings Act.
10. H. R. Rep. No. 382, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
11. S. Rep. No. 2053, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936).
12. 81 Cong. Rec. 7496 (1937).
13. A recent District court decision held the McGuire Act unconstitutional as to the non-
signer provision. Sunbeam Corp. v. Richardson, 144 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Ky. 1956). See
25 Fordham L. Rev. 547 (1956).
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eliminating price competition at every functional level, provided that brand
versus brand competition exists. The legislators evidently had no reason to fear
any monopolistic danger in giving such protection to the good will of producers
so long as the producer is engaged in a business open to competition, 14 and this
is true whether the manufacturer is integrated or not because price competition
in the resale of the branded product in either case is eliminated, and in neither
case does the price fixing extend beyond the manufacturer's own product. It
would seem, therefore, that the Supreme Court in the instant case by a strict
construction of the Miller-Tydings Act unnecessarily discriminates against par-
tially integrated manufacturers.
Anti-Trust - Monopoly Power - Relevant Market.-The United States
brought this civil action against defendant corporation to restrain it from monop-
olizing, attempting to monopolize and conspiring to monopolize interstate com-
merce in cellophane and cellulosic caps and bands in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. The lower court entered judgment in favor of defendant on all
issues. On appeal to the Supreme Court, limited to the question of monopolizing
cellophane, held, three justices dissenting, judgment affirmed. While it might be
conceded that, were cellophane found to be the relevant market defendant had
monopolized, the true relevant market is all flexible wraps, and in this market
defendant did not have monopoly power. United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
Section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act reads: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . .. to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . ..shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor."' In order to convict a defendant of monopolizing, the
government must first prove that the defendant possessed monopoly power over
a part of trade or commerce. Monopoly power has been defined as the power to
control prices or to eliminate competition from the market in which the putative
monopolizer is operating.2  A monopolist, then, is one who controls a part of
commerce or a "market." He may exercise his control and actively exclude com-
petitors or he may simply control the market by holding the power unexercised.
So long as he has the ability to exercise it when he so desires that is sufficient.8
Before deciding whether a given defendant is a monopolist, the court must first
determine the market in which he is dealing.4 This is not always easy to do.
14. " . . . (The producer) establishes his price at his peril-the peril that if he sets It
too high, either the consumer will not buy or, if the article is, nevertheless, popular, the high
profits will invite even more competition .... " Brandeis, Cut-throat Prices, Harper's
Weekly, 10, 12 (Nov. 15, 1913).
1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1951).
2. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
3. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; United States v. Alumi-
num Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation, 50
Mich. L. Rev. 1139 (1952).
4. Attorney General, Report of the National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
44-48 (1955).
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The boundaries of a "relevant market" are not easily defined. On the one
hand we know that every manufacturer of a trade-marked item has complete
control over his particular product. This is not considered a monopoly in the
true sense of the term. Certainly the makers of Seven-Up do not run afoul of
the act because only they can produce that particular soft drink. On the other
hand there is no traded product for which some substitute cannot be found.
Although the use to which two products may be put is one factor in determining
whether or not they are in the same relevant market, it is not the sole criterion.
For example, bicycles are not in the same market with automobiles though they
are both used for transportation. It must in addition be determined whether the
buying public will readily switch from one to the other; not whether under great
stress or extraordinary price disparity they will be induced to do so, but whether
such correlation between price, quality and consumer taste exists that a relatively
small price fluctuation in one would cause a switch to the other.
Because each market situation is unique, the courts have found it difficult to
make general pronouncements applicable in all cases. In defining what the Sher-
man Act means by "a part of commerce," they have been able to do no more
than point out the broad outlines of the problem and leave subsequent cases to
be coped with on an ad hoc basis. Thus in certain cases the relevant market has
been found to be quite limited,5 while in other cases a much broader view has
been taken.0 Conflicting factors must in each case be weighed.7
Products compete with each other for the consumer dollar. The area in which
an alleged monopolist's products effectively compete with others is termed the
market.8 This market may first be defined geographically.? Products which are
not offered for sale within the same geographic area cannot, of course, compete with
each other. No one would contend that the New York Times provides competition
for the Los Angeles Inquirer. Were the Times accused of monopolizing, the
question to be answered would be whether the Times had the power to fix prices
and exclude competitors, not within the newspaper market generally, but within
the New York City newspaper market. Thus a market may be as wide geographi-
cally as the borders of the country, or may be limited to one state or one city.
Once the market has been outlined geographically, then the further question
must be determined: whether within this geographic location the products in
S. Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (original dre-es as opposed
to originals plus copies); Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States, 23 US. 344 (1933)
(bituminous coal as opposed to all fuels); United States v. Aluminum Co., 143 F2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945) (virgin aluminum as opposed to all aluminum, virgin and secondary).
6. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 US. 594 (1953) (all newspaper
adverstising in New Orleans as opposed to advertising in morning papers only); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) (all gasoline as opposed to only that produced
by cracking); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949),
aff'd, 187 F.2d 919, rehearing denied, 190 F.2d 73, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 875 (1951) (a
Robinson-Patman Act case).
7. laple Flooring Manufacturers Assn v. United States, 26S U.S. 563 (1925).
S. See Note, The Market: A Concept in Anti-Trust, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 50 (1954).
9. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 US. 594 (1953); Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Farmer's Guide Co. v. Prairie Co., 293 US. 26S
(1934).
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question effectively compete for the same customers.10 The end uses, prices,
qualities of the products are all factors to be weighed in reaching an answer.
These factors are all important, but the ultimate question is whether the con-
sumer will have a tendency to use the two products interchangeably, depending
upon who gives him the best deal in terms of price and quality. This is known
as "cross-elasticity of demand;" it is the controlling test, the other factors being
used only as a guide to its determination.
In the instant case, cellophane has markedly different physical characteristics
from glassine and waxed paper, the products claimed to be its chief competitors
within the flexible wrap field." Between cellophane and Reynolds Wrap the dif-
ference is even greater. Yet the majority found that among all of these products
theie was sufficient "cross-elasticity of demand" to warrant their being placed
within the same relevant market.12 The court pointed to the fact that these prod-
ucts were used for many of the same purposes. Cellophane furnishes less than
7% of wrappings for bakery products, 25%o for candy, 32%'o for snacks, 35%
for meats and poultry, 27' for crackers and biscuits, 47 %o for fresh produce and
347o for frozen foods. Customers, it was found, would switch from cellophane
to the other wraps and back again, depending upon which seemed to offer the
greatest advantage at the time. Any competitive edge given cellophane by its
superior physical characteristics was balanced by the fact that it was higher
priced. Indeed, the court found that du Pont was forced to lower its prices in
order to stay in competition.
The dissent,' 3 on the other hand, placed great emphasis upon the physical dif-
ferences between cellophane and other wraps,14 though they admitted that if
there were sufficient "cross-elasticity of demand" these differences would not be
controlling. They found, however, that cellophane's sales increased despite its
higher price. That when du Pont did lower its prices, it appeared not to affect
the market positions of glassine and waxed paper. In short, it was their finding
that the qualitative differences between cellophane and the so-called competing
wraps were so great that moderate price variations would not induce a purchaser
to change from one to the other. Thus, they held that cellophane constituted its
own market and that du Pont monopolized this market. If the market concept is
widened to include physically different products, they warned, it will virtually
"emasculate § 2 of the Sherman Act."' 5
10. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
11. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, App. B (1956).
12. The trial court found that defendant did not have monopoly power over cellophane.
They further held that even if it did, this was the lawful monopoly of the patent owner.
Both holdings were contested on appeal, but in light of its findings that defendant was not
a monopolist, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the patent question. The
issue of whether this was a monopoly "thrust upon" defendant was likewise rendered moot.
13. Justices Warren, Black and Douglas. Justice Frankfurter concurred in a separate
opinion.
14. See, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See also
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d
919, rehearing denied, 190 F.2d 73, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
15. For a discussion of this case see, Handler, Annual Antitrust Review, Record of the
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, pp. 391-94 (Oct. 1956).
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The price policies of all products are somewhat limited by the possibility that
substitutes may step in if they get too far out of line.10 But it would render
section 2 of the Sherman Act meaningless to place every possible substitute
within the same relevant market. The courts must use a reasonable approach.'-
While it must be admitted, as the dissent contends, that cellophane and other
wraps are not the "selfsame product" of the Times-Picayune case,h still the key
question is whether in the ordinary push and pull of business two or more prod-
ucts are in effective competition. After all, it was to preserve competition and
thus protect the public that the Sherman Act was written. Where, then, despite
considerable physical differences in the products, such competition does exist, it
would be foolish to invoke the Act and impede business because of a technical
requirement that to be within the same relevant market products must be sub-
stantially fungible. This is the reasoning behind the majority opinion. It is the
only approach to the market question that is consistent with the philosophy
which gave rise to anti-trust legislation.
Banking - Section 239 (3) of the New York Banking Law - Competency
of the Depositor in a Survivorship Action.-Decedent, near death, directed
that respondent, her daughter, be given powers of attorney over four savings
accounts in order to facilitate the payment of bills. After private consultation
with her attorney, decedent in the presence of witnesses signed powers of attor-
ney for two accounts and signature cards in the statutory joint deposit form for
the other two. Subsequently, respondent as executrix refused to charge herself
with the proceeds of the latter, claiming exclusive ownership thereto under sec-
tion 239 (3) of the New York Banking Law. The Surrogate found that respond-
ent had failed to establish that decedent knowingly and consciously created and
sanctioned the joint accounts. The Appellate Division reversed. Upon appeal to
the Court of Appeals, held, three judges dissenting, reversed. Where there is
question concerning the competency of the depositor or the genuineness of her
act, a joint deposit in the statutory form is not conclusive evidence of an intent to
make a gift of the survivor under the New York Banking Law, section 239 (3).
In re Creektore's Estate, 1 N.Y.2d 284, 135 N.E.2d 193 (1956).
Generally at common law the mere fact that money was deposited to the
account of the owner and another did not show an intent to make a gift.1 The
effect of this rule has been altered in many jurisdictions by the enactment of
statutes making deposits in a prescribed form either presumptive or conclusive
16. United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.DN.Y. 1916).
17. Not to be confused with the legal "Rule of Reason" as outlined by Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911).
18. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
1. Commercial Trust Co. v. White, 99 NJ.Eq. 119, 132 At!. 761 (Ch. 1926); Thomas v.
Houston, 181 N.C. 91, 106 S.E. 466 (1921); Drinkhouse v. German Say. & Loan Sacy, 17
Cal. App. 162, 118 Pac. 953 (1911); Kelly v. Beers, 194 N.Y. 49, 86 N.E. 9S0 (190).
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evidence of the depositor's intent to make a gift in joint tenancy.2 In 1907 the
New York legislature in revising the Banking Law of 1892 provided, in a section
pertaining to savings banks, that when a deposit was jointly made in form to be
paid to either party so named or the survivor as to the deposits and any additions
thereto the parties so named were considered joint tenants.3 When dictum in a
subsequent survivorship action4 indicated that parol evidence might be admis-
sible to show that the depositors never intended to create a joint account and
thus effectively destroy the incidents thereof, the legislature in revising the Bank-
ing Law added the following provision to the section relating to savings accounts:
"The making of the deposit in such form shall, in the absence of fraud or undue
influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding to which either
such savings bank or the surviving depositor is a party, of the intention of
both depositors to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in such
survivor."'
The conclusive presumption of the amended statute was severely criticised in
Matter of Buchanan6 where the question on appeal was whether the remainder
of a joint account in the statutory form, established and maintained by the
decedent solely from the funds and for the convenience of the survivor, should be
assessed with a transfer tax. Upon affirming the Surrogate's finding in the nega-
tive it was the opinion of the court that, if the statute were to be interpreted so
as to conclusively presume a joint tenancy with its survivorship incidents in the
case of joint accounts created without the consent of the owner of the money so
deposited, such interpretation would be invalid. That the conscious creation of
the joint account is a condition precedent to the operation of the statutory pre-
sumption was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Fenelon, cit-
ing Matter of Buchanan with approval. "The Appellate Division of the third
department has held that, in order that the statutory presumptions may take
effect, the form of the deposit, as made, must have been sanctioned by the
owner of the moneys directed to be deposited. . . . Obviously, if the law were
otherwise, then the whim or error of the banker, in writing the form of the
deposit, or a direction by one who has converted the moneys, might operate to
transfer title of the true owner to the moneys without volition on his part. The
law does not countenance involuntary transfers of that character." Since the
volition of the depositor was not in issue, when it was established upon reargu-
ment that the requisite forms had been signed, the statute was held operative. 9
Prior to Matter of Fenelon, in Moskowitz v. Marrow,'0 a case where the con-
2. Cal. Gen. Laws Ann. act 652, § 15A (1931); Vt. Rev. Stat. § 8780 (1947); 2 Colo.
Stat. Ann. c.18, § 45 (1935) ; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 17:9A-218 (Supp. 1948).
3. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1907, c.247, § 114.
4. Clary v. Fitzgerald, 155 App.Div. 659, 140 N.Y.Supp.536 (4th Dep't 1913), aff'd
without opinion, 213 N.Y. 696, 107 N.E. 1075 (1915).
5. N.Y. Sess. Law 1914, c.369, § 249(3), (Now N.Y. Banking Law § 239(3)).
6. 184 App. Div. 237, 171 N.Y.Supp. 708 (3d Dep't 1918) (dictum).
7. 262 N.Y. 57, 186 N.E. 201 (1933) (dictum).
8. Id. at 59, 186 N.E. at 202.
9. Matter of Fenelon, 262 N.Y. 308, 186 N.E. 794 (1933).
10. 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506 (1929).
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scious creation of the deposit was not in issue, the validity of the conclusive
presumption of the statute was unanimously upheld. In this situation there
is an irrebuttable presumption that the depositor, in creating a joint account
in the statutory form, intended to vest title to the remainder thereof in the
survivor; it is conclusively presumed that he intended the incidents of the
statutory tenancy so created. In such an action the form of the deposit is control-
ling." This has been the holding of the courts even in cases where the evidence
proved the actual motive or intent of the depositor was otherwise. In Matter of
Juedetl ' a daughter withdrew funds from a joint account; decedent, as the con-
tributing depositor, had acquiesced in its creation. The court upon finding that
the decedent never intended to endow his daughter with a vested interest as a joint
tenant ordered that such funds as were withdrawn by her during the lifetime of
both depositors be turned over to the decedent's executor. Nevertheless, the
daughter still received title to the remainder of the same account by virtue of the
conclusive presumption of section 239 (3). In Inda v. Indala plaintiff's intestate
deliberately set up two joint accounts in the statutory form, one in the name of
a son and a fictitious party and the other in the name of a wife of a son and a
fictitious party in order to make the provisions of section 83 of the Decedents
Estate Law inapplicable. Although the trial court found that the decedent at no
time intended to divest himself of ownership of the accounts, the Court of
Appeals held that the actual intent of the decedent was immaterial since by fully
'complying with the terms of the statute he had created a joint tenancy.1 4 Thus
the requisite of conscious creation does not require the depositor to understand
all the incidents of a joint tenancy.Y5 It has been sufficient that he be aware that
he is creating a joint account in form payable to either or survivor.,
In the instant case the minority was of the opinion that the accounts had been
validly created, noting that the decedent signed the requisite forms after consul-
tation with her attorney, that there was no allegation of fraud or undue influence
and that there was nothing in the record indicating that this was not the free act
of a competent person. They concluded, therefore, that respondent by operation
of the statute was entitled to the money in the accounts.
Although the opinion is not clear, in reversing the Appellate Division, it
appears to have been the reasoning of the majority that the physical condition
of the decedent, coupled with the apparent unlikelihood of any intent on her
part to disinherit appellant raised an inference that the joint account had not
been consciously created. Incapacity, however, cannot be inferred merely from
11. Matter of Porianda, 256 N.Y. 423, 176 N.E. 826 (1931).
12. 280 N.Y. 37, 19 N.E.2d 671 (1939).
13. 288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942).
14. Inda v. Inda 28S N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942), is limited to accounts couciously
created. Matter of Yauch, 270 App.Div. 348, 59 N.Y.S.2d 642 (3d Dep't), afrd, 296 N.Y.
585, 68 N.E.2d 875 (1946).
15. But see Matter of McCarthy, 164 Misc. 719, 299 N.Y.Supp. 715 (Surr.Ct. 1937), alFd
without opinion, 254 App.Div. 827, 6 N.Y.S.2d 1S6 (Ist Dep't 1938); Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co. v. Van Nyevelt, 70 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup.Ct. 1947).
16. In re Sheehan's Estate, ls N.Y.S.2d 872 (Surr.Ct. 1950).
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old age or illness, 17 and should not be inferred from a speculation as to the
depositor's intent. Inherent in this latter inference, as a necessary premise, is a
holding that the depositor must understand the incidents of the joint tenancy if
he is to be charged with the conscious creation thereof. Such an implication
would effect a statutory revision which the legislature has refused to make,' 8 and
as a practical matter it would nullify the conclusiveness of the statutory pre-
sumption since evidence would be admissible in an attack on incompetency to
show that the depositor did not understand the incidents of the joint tenancy.
Constitutional Law - Concurrent Powers - Validity of State Sedition
Statute.-Defendant, an acknowledged member of the Communist party, was
convicted of advocating the overthrow of the federal government under the Penn-
sylvania Sedition Act. His conviction was affirmed by the Superior Court but
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed on the ground that the federally
enacted Smith Act had superseded the state statute. The two laws, substantially
similar, make it a crime to knowingly encourage any person to overthrow, by
force or threat of force, the government of the State or of the United States.
Upon appeal the United States Supreme Court, held, three justices dissenting,
affirmed. Congress has pre-empted the field to the exclusion of parallel state
legislation. The dominant interest of the federal government precludes state
intervention, and administration of state acts would conflict with the operation
of the federal plan. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
Under our federal system there are functions of government which a state may
not exercise because such matters have been committed by the Constitution of
the United States to the care of the federal government. In areas where federal
power is exclusive states may not act at all, even though Congress has not exer-
cised its power.' However, cases in fields over which Congress is considered to
have exclusive jurisdiction indicate that under the states' police power certain
local regulation is not superseded even when Congress has acted.2 In areas of
concurrent jurisdiction federal law is supreme; 3 but it is often a perplexing
problem whether Congress has precluded state action or, by the choice of selective
regulatory measures, has left the police power of the states undisturbed except
as the state and federal regulations collide.
17. Horn v. Pullman, 72 N.Y. 269 (1878); Matter of Wolf, 196 App.Div. 722, 188
N.Y.Supp. 438 (4th Dep't 1921).
18. Law Revision Commission, Act, Recommendation and Study relating to Presumption
of Joint Tenancy of Bank Deposits, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(Q) (1950).
1. The rule was applied in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1950) ; Dixie Ohio Express Co.
v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72 (1938); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276
U.S. 245 (1928).
3. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176
(1942).
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The power of a state to proscribe sedition aimed at the United States Govern-
ment was upheld by the Supreme Court before a federal act existed and prece-
dent suggests strongly that such a state statute is on firm constitutional ground:
The Smith Act is patterned after and is almost identical with the New York
statute punishing sedition, the constitutionality of which had been sustained in
Gitlow v. New York,5 which was cited with approval by the Supreme Court as
recently as 1951 in Dennis v. United States.0 A state has an inalienable right
and an inescapable duty to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens,
and in their behalf to preserve its own existence and the existence of our national
government. 7 Thus, in absence of federal legislation there is no bar to punish-
ment of sedition by a state.
There is no doubt that Congress may preclude the states from enacting anti-
subversive legislation and nullify the existing state laws. The Supreme Court
has long insisted that an intention of Congress to exclude states from exerting
their police power must be clearly manifested.8 Neither the Smith Act nor its
legislative history expressly indicates whether Congress intended to exercise its
federal power to the exclusion of state legislation. If the intent of Congress is
not clear, it is to be gathered from examining prior law, the conditions causing
the enactment, the goal to be obtained, and the results which will likely flow9
At the time of the passage of the revised Smith Act, Congress knew of the exten-
sive state sedition and treason laws, some of which have existed for over one
hundred years.'0 It also knew that despite the activities of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Communists had infiltrated into many key positions and that in
order to combat the perils of Communism it needed the active assistance and
cooperation of all states. The legislative history of the Internal Security Act of
1950 indicates that at that time Congress did not believe the Smith Act had
occupied the field."
In the absence of clear indications of congressional intent and policy, the ques-
tion as to what extent federal interests and responsibilities dominate the field has
been a crucial one. In Gilbert v. Minnesota'2 the Supreme Court approved a
Minnesota statute making it a misdemeanor to teach or advocate that men should
not enlist in the military forces of United States or the state of Minnesota. The
4. United States v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Duane v. United States,
138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790, rehearing denied, 320 US. 814 (1943);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). An impressive number of decisions by state
courts to the same effect is collected in Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1494 (1931). See also Note,
Criminal Syndicalism and Civil Liberties, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 357 (1941).
S. 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 160, 161.
6. 341 US. 494 (1951).
7. Thornhlll v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 105,
113 (1940); Wortex Aills v. Textile Workers, 369 Pa. 359, 85 A. Zd 851 (1952).
8. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin E. R. Bd., 315 US. 740 (1942); Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co, 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
9. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 105, 112 (1948).
l0. 9 Fed. BJ. 71 (1947).
11. H.R.Rep. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950); H.R.Rep. No. 1980, 81t Cong.,
2d Sess. 25-46 (1950) (Un-American Activities Committee).
12. 254 U.S. 325 (1920); Minn. Gen. Stat. §§ 8521(1)-(6) (1917).
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statute was held to be an appropriate aid to the federal war powers based upon
legitimate interests of the state and was sustained simply as a local police meas-
ure having only an incidental effect on the concededly federal function of raising
armies. In regard to the state the court said, " . . . it has power to regulate the
conduct of its citizens and to restrain the exertion of baleful influences against
the promptings of patriotic duty to the detriment of the welfare of the Nation
and State. To do so is not to usurp a national power; it is only to render a serv-
ice to its people. ... 13 The contention that the state law was a cause of
danger to the federal government and that the problem was solely of national
concern was rejected by the Court but accepted analogously by the majority in
the instant case.
On the other hand, it seems clear that where the interests of the national
government are undeniably paramount it required very little legislation by Con-
gress to spell exclusion from the field for the states and conflict between state and
federal statutes has not been necessary. Declaring invalid a Pennsylvania state
alien registration act, the Supreme Court in Hines v. Davidowitz'4 held that by
the enactment of the Federal Registration Act of 1940 Congress had, by reason
of the comprehensive nature of the federal legislation pre-empted the field. The
case stressed paramount interest in the national government and has since been
interpreted as creating a presumption of congressional intent to pre-empt the
field in areas of supreme national importance.15 The rationale of the opinion is,
however, expressed quite clearly; viz., Congress had exclusive power in foreign
affairs and local interference would create grave international controversies. In
distinction, the statutes involved in the present case do not deal with the Com-
munist party as foreign controlled.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.'6 classified the cases in which supersession has
occurred. The first category involves cases in which the scheme of federal regu-
lation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the states to supplement it. Secondly, the act of Congress may touch a
field in which the federal system may be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject. The third instance occurs when the object sought
to be obtained by the federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by
it reveal the same purpose as the state law. Finally, the state policy may produce
a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.
These guideposts are not mechanical rules and have not been applied to anti-
subversive legislation. For example, in 1952 the Michigan Trucks Act, 17 requir-
ing the registration of Communists and excluding them from elections in the
state, was challenged unsuccessfully before the district court which rejected the
contention that sections of the act were invalid on the ground that the Internal
Security Act of 195018 had occupied the field to the exclusion of state regula-
13. 254 U.S. at 330, 331.
14. 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§ 1801-09 (Supp. 1940).
15. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
16. Id. at 218.
17. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.243 (11) (22) (Cum. Supp. 1953).
18. Act of Sept. 23, 1950 c. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22, 50 U.S.C.A.). For a complete analysis of the act see Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 606 (1951).
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tion.'2 Thus, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of federal laws
touching the same subject, there can be no clear formula.20 The question is
sometimes answered by the crosscurrent of issues involved in each case and it
is only certain that where there is a direct and positive conflict between a state
law and a federal act, the state law cannot stand.2
In the instant opinion the majority examined the congressional legislation
embodied in the Smith Act of 19 4 0,m the Internal Security Act of 1950,24 and
the Communist Control Act of 19 5 4 .5 It concluded that federal anti-sedition
legislation evidenced a congressional plan to occupy the field and coincidence is
as ineffective as opposition. Dominant interest was the second basis of the deci-
sion; sedition against the United States is a national offense and not local. The
Court found further ground for abrogating the state statute because, in its view,
the state's administration of the act may hamper the enforcement of the federal
law and the federal government alone possesses the peculiar competence neces-
sary to deal with Communism. Statements of President Roosevelt and Mr.
Hoover, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, were quoted in
support. A more careful reading of these statements reveals, however, that their
purpose was simply to encourage prompt revelation of evidence of subversive
activities so that the federal agency could be fully advised. It is illogical to
employ these statements to suppress state prosecutions when the statements
themselves solicit state cooperation and disclosure by state officers of any evi-
dence of subversion. State officers or agencies are unlikely to ferret out evidence
of subversion when they are forbidden to prosecute the crimes involved. There-
fore, the majority's position thwarts the purposes the statements of President
Roosevelt and Mr. Hoover sought to serve. It is also interesting to note that in
the instant case the Department of Justice appeared as amicus curiae on behalf
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and stressed the wartime security require-
ments of this period (1940) when the quoted statements were made.
The dissent pointed out that Congress has not, in any of its statutes relating
to sedition, specifically barred the exercise of state power to punish the same acts
under state law. Federal sedition laws show no congressional regulatory scheme
which might be upset by a coinciding state plan and the conflict should be clear
19. Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (ED. Mich. 1952). In a per curiam opinion
the Supreme Court remanded with directions to vacate the restraining order and to hold the
proceedings in abeyance a reasonable time pending construction of the statute by the state
courts. 345 U.S. 242 (1953).
20. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
21. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (California Statute punishing the operat-
ing of a car-pool without an I.C.C. license was not superseded by a federal statute with
which it was coincident).
22. Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912); Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How..)
227 (1359). In general see Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 262 (1946).
23. IS U.S.C.A. § 2333 (1951).
24. Act of Sept. 23, 1950 c. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22, S0 U.S.CA.).
25. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 782, 784, 786, 7S9, 790-93, 841-44 (Supp. 195).
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and direct before the court reads an intent to void state legislation. 20 Judicial
fear of possible difficulties does not seem a valid reason for ousting a state from
exercise of its police power in criminal matters. Such should be left for explicit
legislative determination. Nor can it be said that in the responsibility of national
and local governments to protect themselves against sedition there is a "dominant
interest." The minority concluded by saying it is in and of itself decisive that
the Smith Act appears in title 18 of the United States Code of which section
3231 provides: "Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the
jurisdiction of the courts of the several states under the laws thereof." The
courts have interpreted this section to mean that states may provide concurrent
legislation in the absence of explicit congressional intent to the contrary.21 This
forceful argument was not discussed by the majority.
Constitutional Law - Due Process - Constitutionality of City Charter
Providing for Sumnmary Dismissal of Teacher Invoking Fifth Amendment.
Plaintiff, a teacher employed by the Board of Higher Education of the City of
New York, invoked the privilege against self incrimination while appearing
before an investigating subcommittee of the United States Senate. He was dis-
charged on the basis of section 903 of the Charter of the City of New York
which provides for the summary dismissal of any city employee who utilizes
the privilege against self incrimination to avoid answering a question relating
to his official conduct. His petitions for reinstatement were dismissed by the
New York Supreme Court and the dismissal was affirmed by the Appellate
Division and the Court of Appeals. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, four justices dissenting, reversed. City Charter section 903, provid-
ing for the summary dismissal of city employees invoking the fifth amendment,
is violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Slochower
v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
It has been held that a governmental agency may, as a condition of govern-
mental employment, require its employees to waive constitutional rights.1 Such
restrictions upon employment have been upheld by both state2 and federal courts
26. The present decision has caused legislation to be introduced in Congress which would
preclude the Supreme Court from reading an intent to void state legislation into the Smith
Act. 11 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News VI, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. (1956).
27. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
1. Christal v. Police Comm'n, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939); Bell v. District
Court, 314 Mass. 622, 51 N.E.2d 328 (1943). Justice (then Judge) Holmes stated in Mc-
Auliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892): "The petitioner may have
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.
There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his con-
stitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract.
The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered
him."
2. Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940); McAuliffe v. Mayor,
supra note 1.
3. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947); Washington v. Clark, 84 F.
Supp. 964 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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so long as they are reasonably related to the employee's qualification for the
employment in question.4
In the instant case, the Court was presented with a situation wherein the
city, by virtue of section 903,5 had imposed as a condition to employment
the waiving of the constitutional privilege against self incrimination. The
Court did not decide whether such a condition violated the "privileges and
immunities" clause of the fourteenth amendment. It held that it was unneces-
sary to consider whether section 903 imposed a penalty on the exercise of a
federal privilege because it concluded that Slochower's summary dismissal
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The majority apparently predicated its conclusion on two lines of reasoning.
First, the Court denounced the automatic manner in which Slochower was dis-
missed. It adhered to the rule laid down in Wicman v. Updegraff7 that
" ...constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose ex-
clusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." With
this rule in mind the Court, in condemning the automatic discharge under
section 903, said: "No consideration is given to such factors as the subject
matter of the questions, remoteness of the period to which they are directed, or
justification for exercise of the privilege .... The heavy hand of the statute
falls alike on all who exercise their constitutional privilege. ... 3
The Court distinguished Adler v. Board of EducationO and Garner v. Board
of Public Works.'0 In the two latter cases the Supreme Court upheld a city's
right to inquire into the fitness of a public servant. In each of those cases,
however, it was required that the state conform to due process. In the Adler
case, the Court pointed out that under the New York Feinberg Law"1 employees
4. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 435, 492 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721 (1951).
5. "If any... employee of the city shall ... refuse to testify or to answer any question
regarding the property, government or affairs of the city ... or regarding the nomination,
election, appointment or official conduct of any officer or employee of the city ... on the
ground that his-answer would tend to incriminate him ... his term or tenure of office or
employment shall terminate ...." New York City Charter, § 903.
6. Due process has been defined as: " . . . the protection of the individual against arbi-
trary action ...." Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 US. 292, 302
(1937). "What it [due process] does require is that state action, whether through one
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions and not infrequently are desg-
nated as 'law of the land? " Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 US. 312, 316-17 (1926). A denial
of due process is " .. . a practice repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 US. 319, 323 (1937).
7. 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). In this case the Court held as violative of due process a
state law excluding persons from state employment solely on the basis of membership in
subversive organizations whether or not such persons were ignorant of the activities or
purposes of such groups.
S. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, S58 (1956).
9. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
10. 341 US. 716 (1951).
11. N.Y. Civil Service Law, § 12-a.
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of public schools are dismissed only after notice and hearing-an important
factor absent in section 903.
Mr. Justice Reed with whom Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Minton
joined in dissent rejected the argument that section 903, as construed, con-
stituted a denial of due process. He recognized that a teacher occupies an
important role in shaping the minds of students and that "' . . . the school
authorities have the right and duty to screen the officials, teachers, and em-
ployees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of
ordered society. .... '1112 The three dissenting justices further found that
section 903 accomplished such a purpose since " . . . avoidance of public duty
to furnish information can properly be considered to stamp the employee as a
person unfit to hold certain official positions."' 3
In a separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan expressed a similar view,
stating that a state is within its rights to consider teachers who invoke the fifth
amendment as to questions relating to their official conduct as jeopardizing
" . . . the confidence that the public should have in its school system,"' 4 and
a consequent dismissal based on section 903 is not violative of due process. Mr.
Justice Reed reasoned that due process is not something to be invoked simply
because the Supreme Court disagrees with the legal conclusions of a state court;
but rather, due process is violated when state action is " . . . inconsistent with
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice. . .. .- 5
The Court also denounced Slochower's dismissal on the basis of Ullniann v.
United States,:6 wherein it was suggested that invocation of the fifth amend-
ment does not, under any circumstances, warrant a conclusive presumption of
guilt or perjury. It felt that the Board of Education imputed a sinister meaning
to Slochower's refusal to testify, and on the basis of this imputation, dismissed
him. Thus, again, the Court considered the discharge as violative of due process
since the taking of such an inference is unwarranted and unreasonable and
thereby denies the individual protection against arbitrary action.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, attacked this conclusion. He
noted, quite properly, that there was no question before the Court as to whether
the Board made any sinister inferences since the New York Court of Appeals
expressly stated that " . . . no inference of membership in the Communist
party may be drawn from the assertion of one's privilege against self incrimina-
tion. . . ,u1 and the vacatur resulted from " . . . the assertion of the priv-
ilege . . . [which in itself] is equivalent to a resignation."18
Certainly, the scoring of the sinister inference attached to the privilege was
timely but somewhat irrelevant to the case at hand. It is not necessary to
assume that a dismissal under section 903 is based upon such inferences even
though the Board did argue that such inferences could legitimately be drawn.
12. 350 U.S. at 563.
13. Id. at 561.
14. Id. at 566.
15. Id. at 563.
16. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
17. Daniman v. Board of Education, 306 N.Y. 532, 538, 19 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1954).
18. Ibid.
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This statute, in order to operate, did not depend upon guilt or innocence, but
solely on invoking the privilege. Its purpose was not to keep Communists out
of our public schools; the Feinberg Law does that. Its purpose was to penalize
an employee for failure to cooperate with authorities when asked questions re-
lating to his official conduct. It would seem reasonable for a state to require
its employees to cooperate with official governmental inquiries related to em-
ployment and failure to cooperate would appear to be a reasonable criterion
to determine the fitness of employees.
The Court, in addition to denouncing the sinister inferences attached to the
privilege, denounced the summary manner in which Slochower was disminsed.
It is obvious that it considered a hearing a sinc qua non to dismissal. However,
exactly what this Court deemed an adequate hearing to satisfy the requirements
of due process is not too clear. Apparently it expected the Board to give con-
sideration to the subject matter of the questions, the period to which they relate
and to any justification one may have for invoking the privilege. If this simply
means that the Board must determine that the investigating committee was
authorized and that the question asked did pertain to the " . . .property,
government or affairs of the city. . . " then it would seem to be a proper
requirement of due process in order to protect an individual from arbitrary acts.
For if the committee was not authorized or if the questions did not relate to
official matters, then the employee invoking the privilege should have an
opportunity to explain his action to the Board.
But if the Court intended that no employee could be dismissed if he were
justified in invoking the privilege then the effect of section 903 is vitiated.
As a result the state would be powerless to rid itself of employees who, fearing
prosecution, feel no duty to cooperate with governmental authorities.
Contracts - Fraud - Specific Disclaimer of E.%-trinsic Representations.
The parties, husband and wife, had separated and litigation respecting a division
of property between them was pending when a settlement agreement was exe-
cuted. It contained a provision that neither had made any representations con-
cerning the continuation of the marital status. Thereafter, the vife sued the
husband, alleging that he had knowingly and falsely represented to her ihat they
would be reconciled permanently, and that in reliance thereon she executed the
settlement agreement. The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint. On appeal, the Appellate Division, two justices
dissenting, held, affirmed. A specific disclaimer precludes proof of reliance upon
alleged misrepresentations in the absence of duress or an allegation that the
plaintiff failed to read or understand the disclaimer. Cohen v. Cohen, 1 A.D.2d
586, 151 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Ist Dep't 1956).
It has generally been accepted that one who fraudulently obtains a written
agreement may not obtain immunity for his fraud by including in such agree-
ment a disclaimer of any representation respecting the matter alleged to consti-
19. See note 5 supra.
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tute the fraud.' Such a clause, commonly called a "merger clause,"2 may be in
the form of a covenant to the effect that all representations are contained in the
writing, or that the written contract is the entire agreement between the parties.
Most jurisdictions permit parol evidence to establish the fraud. The principal
reason given is that fraud in the inducement of the contract may be shown for
the purpose of entirely avoiding it, and, therefore, the special provisions fall with
the contract itself.3 The minority rule, stressing the advantage to be gained by
certainty in the contractual relationship,4 distinguishes between fraud in the
inducement of the contract and fraud in its execution, permitting proof of the
latter but not of the former.5 Some courts have in recent years restricted the
application of the minority rule to the point where it is hardly distinguished
from the majority position.(
The court in the instant case stated that the issue was not whether the merger
clause precluded proof of fraudulent misrepresentations, but rather, whether the
plaintiff could prove her reliance on the misrepresentations. She had initialed the
margin beside the specific disclaimer and there was no allegation that she had
failed to read or understand the clause. The majority, therefore, concluded that
it would be impossible for her to prove reliance. The result, as the dissent
soundly points out, gives effect to the merger clause by implication.
Furthermore, since she signed the contract, and did not allege that she did
not understand it, where the plaintiff initialed the agreement is immaterial. Nor
should the absence of an allegation that she has not read the clause or did not
understand it be fatal. The issue is reliance, and although, admittedly a specific
disclaimer renders plaintiff's task of proving reliance more difficult, it does not
make it impossible.
In Bridger v. Goldsmith,7 the contract stated that the only representation
made by defendant was that he was in the piano business. In an action predi-
cated on defendant's fraudulent representations, the court said that public policy
would not allow a party to insulate himself from liability for fraud by the inser-
tion of a merger clause.
1. E.g., Arnold v. National Aniline Co., 20 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1927); Wedge v. Security
First Nat'l Bank, 219 Cal. 113, 25 P.2d 411 (1933) ; Ganley Bros., Inc., v. Butler Bros. Bldg.
Co., 170 Minn. 373, 212 N.W. 602 (1927); Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 38 N.E.
458 (1894); Angerosa v. White Co., 248 App. Div. 425, 290 N.Y. Supp. 204 (4th Dep't
1936), aff'd, 275 N.Y. 524, 11 N.E.2d 325 (1937); Jackson v. New York, 210 App. Div. 115,
205 N.Y. Supp. 658 (4th Dep't 1924); aff'd, 241 N.Y. 563, 150 N.E. 556 (1925); Cal. Civ.
Code § 1668 (1949) ; 3 Corbin, Contracts § 578 (1951) ; 3 Williston, Contracts §§ 811, 811A
(rev. ed. 1936) ; Restatement, Contracts, § 573 (1932).
2. Williston, op. cit. supra note 1.
3. ". . . [Firaud in the inception of the agreement renders voidable the very agreement
not to set up fraud. . . ." Williston, op. cit. supra note 1, § 811.
4. Angerosa v. White Co., 248 App. Div. 425, 290 N.Y. Supp. 204 (4th Dep't 1936),
aff'd, 275 N.Y. 524, 11 N.E.2d 325 (1937).
5. Sullivan v. Roche, 257 Mass. 166, 153 N.E. 549 (1926); Colonial Development Corp.
v. Bragdon, 219 Mass. 170, 106 N.E. 633 (1914).
6. Noack v. Standard Stores, Inc., 281 Mass. 53, 183 N.E. 54 (1932) ; Granlund v. Saraf,
263 Mass. 76, 160 N.E. 408 (1928).
7. 143 N.Y. 424, 38 N.E. 458 (1894).
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The Bridger case was followed in Jackson v. New York,8 where plaintiff con-
tracted with the State of New York to dredge a canal of certain loose material,
and signed an agreement that he relied on his own investigation and not on any
representations made by the state as to the nature of the substance to be re-
moved. In dredging the canal, plaintiff encountered hardpan, a substance much
more difficult and costly to excavate. Plaintiff alleged that the state in fact had
knowingly misrepresented the canal to be filled with soft, loose material. The
court permitted proof of the concealment or fraudulent misrepresentations not-
withstanding the merger clause.
It should be noted that in neither the Bridger nor Jackson cases was there any
allegation that the plaintiff failed to read or understand the disclaimer. On the
contrary, in the Bridger case, the plaintiff, against the advice of his attorney,
consented to the inclusion of the merger clause.
In the instant case the court agreed that one cannot insulate himself from
fraud by a merger clause, but held that it is impossible to prove reliance without
a showing that the merger clause was not understood. This position is illogical,
because it gives effect to the merger clause by implication. Furthermore, the
decision is the more difficult to understand since it is contrary to the established
law of New York.
Criminal Law - Double Jeopardy - Single or Separate Robbery Predi-
cated Upon Stealing Property from Different Persons at the Same Time
and Place.-A, B, C and D were assaulted and robbed. Defendant was
indicted for armed robbery of A, B and C, tried, and acquitted. Subsequently,
defendant was again indicted for armed robbery of D, tried, and convicted. The
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed. On appeal to
the New Jersey Supreme Court, held, three justices dissenting, affirmed. A
separate and distinct offense was committed against each individual and hence
defendant was not in double jeopardy. State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628
(1956).
The doctrine of double or former jeopardy is a creation of the English common
law.' Although its origin is as yet uncertain,2 the plea of double jeopardy is
probably attributable to Blackstone3 who, in discussing the pleas of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict explained them as being founded upon the" . . . uni-
versal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought
into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. '" 4
S. 210 App. Div. 115, 205 N.Y. Supp. 65S (4th Dep't 1924), af'd, 241 N.Y. 563, 150 NE.
556 (1925).
1. State v. Lebato, 7 NJ. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951); State v. DiGioia, 3 N.J. 413, 70 A2d
756 (1950).
2. One writer suggests that the doctrine was not recognized until early in the !seventeenth
century. 9 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 124, 125 (1953).
3. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 336.
4. Other considerations above and beyond the element of unnecessary hamsment which
influence the application of double jeopardy are economy of time and money and paycho-
logical security. Comment, 65 Yale LJ. 339, 341 (1956).
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Today, the federal law and all but five states have constitutional safeguards
against retrial for the same offense subsequent to acquittal or conviction. The
tests employed by the courts relative to a plea of double jeopardy were de-
signed to effectuate the principle that "no man ought to be twice vexed for the
same offense," and while there is wholehearted agreement on the soundness of
the principle, judicial interpretation has been subject to conflicting opinion.
This is particularly evident in those cases wherein the court is called upon to
determine whether a subsequent prosecution is for the "same offense," which
is condemned by the constitution and by common law tradition. To uphold
a plea of double jeopardy the two offenses must be the "same" and a number
of rules for ascertaining such identity have been promulgated.
Perhaps the basic and most common test 7 is that laid down in Rex v. Vander-
comb s that " . . . unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might
have been convicted upon by proof of the facts contained in the second indict-
ment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the second." This
has come to be known generally as the "same evidence" test, and finds support
with the majority of states.9 Under this rule a second prosecution will be barred
if " . . . the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have
been sufficient to secure a legal conviction upon the first. .... "10 Another rule
which has found favor in some states1 is the "same transaction" test, but the
line of demarcation between the two is uncertain, and the same court will
frequently apply both.12
Exceptions or qualifications have been grafted upon the general rule to remedy
the inadequacies which made themselves readily apparent. Thus, where in an
indictment a lesser offense is necessarily included within a greater offense
an acquittal or conviction of the greater operates as a bar to a prosecution for
the lesser.13 Likewise, a second trial for the major offense is not permitted where
5. Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Vermont.
6. "No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense." N.J. Art. Const. I, § 11.
7. For articles discussing the tests see Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 522 (1939) ; Comment, 40
Yale L.J. 462 (1931); 13 Ohio St. L.J. 284 (1952).
8. 2 Leach C.C. 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (Ex. 1796).
9. 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 79, 81 (1937). See State v. Midgeley, 15 N.J. 574, 105 A.2d 844
(1954); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951); State v. DiGiosia, 3 N.J. 413,
70 A.2d 756 (1950); People ex rel. Moskoff v. Weinstock, 55 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
10. State v. DiGiosia, 3 N.J. 413, 419, 70 A.2d 756, 759 (1950).
11. 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 79, 81 (1937); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573
(1941) ; People v. Perrello, 350 Ill. 231, 182 N.E. 748 (1932) ; State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L.
474, 106 Atl. 416 (1919) ; State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1833) ; State v. Greely,
30 N.J. Super. 180, 103 A.2d 639 (County Ct.), aff'd, per curiam, 31 N.J. Super. 542, 107
A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1954).
12. State v. Liebowitz, 22 N.J. 103, 123 A.2d 526 (1956); State v. Shoopman, 11 N.J.
333, 94 A.2d 493 (1953) ; Harris v. State, supra note 11.
13. State v. Midgeley, 15 N.J. 574, 105 A.2d 844 (1954). Acquittal of homicide done In
the commission of a robbery precludes a subsequent trial on an indictment for the robbery.
State v. Greely, 30 N.J. Super. 180, 103 A.2d 639 (County Ct.), aff'd, per curiam, 31 N.J.
Super. 542, 107 A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1954); People v. Wein, 196 App. Div. 368, 187 N.Y.
Supp. 753 (2d Dep't 1921); 22 CJ.S., Criminal Law § 279 (1940); 15 Am. Jur., Criminal
Law § 388 (1938).
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the state elects to try the defendant for the minor crime. 14 The plea of double
jeopardy is also brought into play where the defendant is indicted for the lesser
degree after having been tried for the higher degree of the same offense. Such
a prosecution is barred under the theory that the highest offense includes all
the lesser degrees.-l
The courts find themselves in hopeless conflict in situations where a single
act affects a number of individuals adversely; for example, where the "act" in-
volved is the discharge of a single shot from a firearm. Some jurisdictions hold
that the defendant may be prosecuted as many times as there were persons
affected for the prohibition against putting a person in double jeopardy applies
to the same offense and not the same acLtG On the other hand there is authority
supporting the principle that it is the character of the act, not the results which
flow from it, which is determinative.1 7 Of course, if more than one shot is fired,
the defendant is not in double jeopardy regardless of the length of time between
the shots.1 8
Another line of cases, involving motor vehicle accidents, are split on whether
the offenses are the same. The majority rule appears to be that a separate
offense has been committed against each individual affected.10 New Jersey is
directly contra. In State v. Cosgrove,: ° where the defendant's car struck two
girls at the same time and the defendant was acquitted on a charge of man-
slaughter for the death of one the Court of Errors and Appeals refused to allow
a second prosecution for atrocious assault and battery against the other. This
point was raised later in the case of State v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.21 where
14. State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 AUt. 416 (1919); State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L.
361 (Sup. CL 133) ; 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law § 332 (1938).
15. Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 655 (12th ed. 1955); N.Y. Penal Law § 32.
16. State v. Taylor, 135 Wash. 193, 52 P.2d 1252 (1936); State v. Corbett, 117 S.C.
356, 109 S.E. 133 (1921); Commonwealth v. Browning, 156 Ky. 770, 143 S.W. 407 (1912);
People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. SS (App. Dep't 1924). Cf. MchNii v. State,
47 Fla. 66, 36 So. 175 (1904).
17. Subsequent prosecution barred where defendant was formerly convicted. Taylor v.
State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900); Sadberry v. State, 39 Tes. Crim. 466, 46
S.W. 639 (1898); Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632 (1398); Woodford v. People,
62 N.Y. 117 (1875); Clem. v. State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873). Cf. State v. Rom, 72 N.J.L. 462,
62 A. 695 (1905).
18. State v. Mlelia, 231 Iowa 332, 1 N.W.2d 230 (1941); Combs v. Commonwealth, 259
Ky. 703, 83 S.W.2d 46 (1935); State v. Taylor, 138 Ran. 407, 26 P.2d 593 (1933); Com-
monwealth v. Melissari, 29S Pa. 63, 148 AU. 45 (1929) People v. Stephens, 297 1. 91, 130
N.E. 459 (1921); Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, ISO S.W. 186 (1915).
19. Burton v. State,-- Miss. -, 79 So. 2d 242 (1955) ; Jeppesen v. State, 154 Neb. 765,
49 N.W.2d 611 (1951); State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St. 539, 96 N.E.2d 776 (1951); McHugh
v. State, 160 Fla. 323, 36 So. 2d 736 (1943); Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 532, 26
S.E2d 54 (1943); Commonwealth v. Maguire, 313 Mass. 669, 48 N.E.2d 665 (1943); Flem-
ing v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 209, 144 S.W.2d 220 (1940); State v. Fredund, 20 Minn.
44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937). Contra, State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933);
Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929).
20. 103 NJ.L. 412, 135 At. S71 (1927).
21. 9 NJ. 194, S7 A.2d 709 (1952). See 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 505 (1952).
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eighty-four indictments were returned against the defendant each charging the
railroad with the death of a different individual, the killings all occurring in a
single accident. Although recognizing the conflict in cases of this nature,22
the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the holding in the
Cosgrove case and held that only one criminal offense could be charged.28
Interpretation of the "same offense" where one act results in multiple con-
sequences has also arisen in other factual situations.2 4
A distinction is apparently drawn between cases wherein the property of
several individuals is stolen at the same time and place, and cases wherein the
property of several individuals 'is stolen from their person at the same time
and place. In the former, a conviction or acquittal for the larceny of one owner's
property precludes further prosecution for the rest of the property under the
double jeopardy doctrine.25 Where the offense is directly against the person
however, and property removed from each, it would seem there are separate
assaults, 26 and separate robberies.2 7 Thus, in the instant case, the majority
held that each of the four robberies constituted a " . . . separate and inde-
pendent act with respect to each victim, i.e., the forcible taking of the victim's
property." 28
The doctrine of res judicata is pertinent to the subject of double jeopardy and
although thought of mainly as a defense in a civil action it applies also to
criminal actions. 29 If the defendant can show his acquittal on the first charge
22. "The reasoning between these two schools of thought clashes almost as violently as
the conflicting results, and the basic theories relied upon seem irreconcilable." 9 N.J. at
198, 87 A.2d at 711 (1952).
23. "Admittedly the rule is not universally accepted but no new thought or reason Is
advanced to shake our adherence to a doctrine which has long prevailed here, was affirmed
in our old and new Constitutions and is deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence and bottomed
in the common law." 9 N.J. at 200, 87 A.2d at 712 (1952).
24. See People ex rel. Flinn v. Barr, 259 N.Y. 104, 181 NX. 64 (1932). Ten persons
were killed through the defendant's negligence. The Grand Jury dismissed a charge of man-
slaughter of two of the persons killed and, subsequently, another Grand Jury indicted the
defendants for a similar offense against two of the other persons killed. The New York
Court of Appeals held submission to the second Grand Jury was improper, expressly ap-
proving the Cosgrove case. Accord, Woodford v. People, 62 N.Y. 117 (1875). Transporting
several women across state lines in one car for immoral purposes is one offense. Robinson
v. United States, 143 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1944). Contra, Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d
44 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 758 (1945).
25. 28 A.L.R.2d 1182 (1953); Kelly v. State, 55 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1951).
26. Fews v. State, 1 Ga. App. 122, 58 S.E. 64 (1907). See also McNish v. State, 47 Fla.
66, 36 So. 175 (1904).
27. People v. Lagomarsino, 97 Cal. App. 2d 92, 217 P.2d 124 (1950) ; People v. Rodgers,
184 App. Div. 461, 171 N.Y. Supp. 451 (1st Dep't 1918), aff'd, 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E. 882
(1918); Keeton v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 522, 18 S.W. 359 (1892); In re Allison, 13 Colo.
525, 22 Pac. 820 (1889). Contra, People v. Perrello, 350 Ill. 231, 182 N.E. 748 (1932);
State v. Citius, 331 Mo. 605, 56 S.W.2d 72 (1932). See Novak v. State, 139 Md. 538, 115
AUt. 853 (1921).
28. 21 N.J. at 502, 122 A.2d at 631.
29. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
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was necessarily controlled by the determination of some particular issue, res
judicata will be invoked to bar the action.30 However, a general verdict of not
guilty is insufficient to sustain the truth of an alibi where nothing shows that
the jury did not acquit the defendant because of general insufficiency of proof
or on some other ground.31 In State v. Hoag the question of the defendant's
presence was very crucial. Three of the victims testified at both trials that
they were unable to recognize the defendant as one of the perpetrators of the
robbery. Only one was positive in his identification. The dissenting justices
felt that the defendant's alibi had been established since the primary defense
at the first trial was that the defendant was not present at the scene of the crime
and hence the state was estopped from raising the question againYm However,
the majority stated that the former trial involved questions other than the de-
fendant's identity and there was no way of determining " . . . upon which
question the jury's verdict turned. '*3 Such a determination is not free from
doubt.34
The instant decision would appear to be sound.V 3 The practice of piecemeal
indictments is not to be favored but, as the court points out,30 any change in this
respect must emanate from the legislature. If the legislature required the pros-
ecutor to join the separate indictments in one trial, many of the problems which
confronted this court would be obviated. It would then be within the province
of one jury to determine whether the defendant's alibi is credible, and whether
the proof that the defendant took property from any or all of the victims was
sufficient. The defendant, furthermore, would be protected from successive and
harassing prosecutions.
Insurance - Liability Insurance - Duty to Settle.-Insured as a result of
an automobile accident was sued by the occupants of the other vehicle involved
in the collision, who, in the course of the trial, offered to settle their claim for
an amount within the policy limit. The insurance company, which had assumed
the defense pursuant to the terms of the policy failed to act on the offer and did
not inform the insured of it. A judgment in excess of the policy was entered.
The insured, after paying the excess, instituted the present action against the
insurer to recover that sum. The trial court directed a verdict for the insurer.
30. Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941); People v. Grzsczak, 77 Mkc.
202, 137 N.Y. Supp. 538 (County Ct. 1912).
31. State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940); State v. Coblentz, 169 Md.
159, 1SO At. 266 (1935); State v. Heaton, 56 ND. 357, 217 N.W. 531 (1927); People v.
Rodgers, 184 App. Div. 461, 171 N.Y. Supp. 451 (1st Dep't), afrd, 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E.
882 (1918). But see Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E2d 573 (1941).
32. 21 N.J. at 507, 122 A.2d at 634.
33. 21 N.J. at 505, 122 A.2d at 632. Actually, the court applied the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, the state's cause of action under each indictment being a different one.
34. See the dissenting opinion of State v. Hoag generally.
35. Prof. Knowlton, who briefed and argued the appeal for the defendant, criticizes the
decision in 11 Rutgers L. Rev. 88 (1956).
36. 21 N.J. at 506, 122 A.2d at 633.
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Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Oregon, held, reversed. The insurer owes
the insured the duty of good faith in considering a settlement offer; a failure to
exercise due care in determining whether to accept or reject the offer is evidence
of bad faith. Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., - Ore. -, 298 P.2d
1002 (1956).
The insurer by the terms of the typical liability insurance policy has absolute
control of the defense of any action against the insured, including the right to
settle the claim.1 This gives rise to a "conflict of interest" where an action is
instituted against the insured for an amount in excess of the policy coverage and
an offer to settle is made for an amount within the policy limit.2 The insured
will be anxious to settle regardless of the merits of the claimant's case, while the
insurance company might prefer to litigate especially if the offer approximates
the maximum coverage of the policy.
At one time the rule prevailed that no duty was owed to the insured by the
insurer with respect to a settlement offer; the parties were strictly bound by their
agreement and hence the insurer's liability was restricted to the policy limit.2
Today however, while the mere refusal to settle, in itself,4 or the mere error of
judgment in deciding to contest rather than settle, will not render the insurer
liable, it is recognized that the insurer owes some duty to the insured in deter-
mining whether or not to accept a settlement offer. Two principal tests have
been developed to measure that duty and to determine the insurer's liability, viz.,
the "good faith test" and the "negligence test." G
The negligence rule holds the insurer liable if it fails "... to exercise the
standard of care that a reasonable man would exercise in the management of
1. In the instant case the contract provided: "The company shall defend in his name and
behalf any suit against the insured alleging such injury or destruction and seeking damages
on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company
shall have the right to make such investigation, negotiation, and settlement of any claim or
suit as may be deemed expedient by the company." - Ore. -, -, 298 P. 2d 1002,
1005. Thus, the insurer has the sole right, but not a duty as such, to settle all claims
against the insured. See Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643
(1929).
2. See Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L. J. 100
(1938).
3. Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & C. Co. 92 Me. 574, 43 At. $03 (1899); St.
Joseph Tranfer & Storage Co. v. Employers' Indemnity Corp., 224 Mo. App. 221, 23 S.W.2d
215 (1930); McDonald v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L. 308, 162 Atl. 620 (1932);
Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928).
4. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 672 (1942); Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 269, 91 S.E.
946 (1917); Long. v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931).
5. Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Lawson & Nelson
Sash & Door Co. v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 204 Minn. 50, 282 N.W. 481 (1938);
Mendota Elec. Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 169 Minn. 377, 211 N.W. 317, later ap-
proved, 175 Minn. 181, 221 N.W. 61 (1926).
6. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955). Which rule is the majority rule is doubtful.
Compare Appleman, supra note 2, with Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955); and Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility For Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1954).
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his affairs."17 If the ordinary prudent businessman would have settled the claim
rather than risk litigation, and the insurer failed to settle, it will be liable for
the excess.8
The "good faith" rule has been variously stated with sharp contrasts as to
what constitutes good (or bad) faith.0 "Bad faith" is defined most frequently as
" . . . an intentional disregard of the financial interests of the insured in the
hope of escaping the full responsibility imposed upon it by its policy."' 0 While
the courts have recognized that the interests of the insured must be considered,
there has been disagreement as to the relative weight to be given. Some courts
have said that the insurer is free to accord its own interests paramount consider-
ation," while at least one court has suggested that the insured's interests must
receive priority.' 2 The more recent decisions, employing this test,13 and leading
authorities 14 agree that a good faith test is best achieved by an intermediate
position which would require "equal consideration."
The "good faith" rule has been characterized as a subjective approach; the
"negligence rule" as an objective approach;* and the difference between the two
has been said to be the same as that between intentional and accidental wrong-
doing.' 6 In operation, however, the two rules produce similar results. To show
lack of good faith, the insured need not bear the burden of proving in some direct
way, the actual state of mind of the insurer, but may rely upon circumstantial
7. Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 94 N.H. 4S4, 56 A. 2d 57 (1947).
8. Cavanaugh v. General Acc. F. & L. Assurance Corp., 79 N.H. 156, 105 At. C24
(1919) ; Douglas v. United States Fidelity & G. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 At!. 703 (1924) ; G. A.
Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tes-. 1929); Attleboro
Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 F. 573 (Ist Cir. 1917). The
problem has arisen: Is this reasonably prudent man in an insured or uninsurcd state?
9. Noshey v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 6S F.2d E03 (6th cir. 1934); Abrams v.
Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d 82 (1937); Georgia Cas. Co v.
Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932). For a complete compilation of cases espousing
the "good faith rule" see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 163, 178 (1955).
10. Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 VL 4S1, 491, 1 .4- 2d 817, 820 (193s).
11. Cleveland Wire Spring Co. v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assurance Corp. Ltd., 6
Ohio App. 344 (1917) ; Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 'N.E. 737 (1931);
Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923); Best Bldg. Co. v.
Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928).
12. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).
13. American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co. 173 F.2d 830 (lth Cir. 1949);
Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952); Wilson v. Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co., 145 Me. 370, 76 A2d 111 (1950); National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Ok'la. 175, 200
P.2d 407 (1948); Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W2d 785
(1952). The division between the paramount and equal consideration theories has been
referred to as the difference between the "archaic bad faith test" which permits the in-
surer to further its own interest at the expense of the insured and the "modem bad
faith rule" holding that the insurer must in good faith reach the same result it would
reach if it were unqualifiedly liable for any judgment which might be rendered. Roos, A
Note on the Excess Problem, Ins. L. J. 192 (1952).
14. Roos, supra note 13; Keeton, supra note 6.
15. Roos, supra note 13.
16. Note, 60 Yale L. J. 1037, 1041 (1951); Appleman, supra note 2, at 103.
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evidence. 17 Hence, evidence of bad faith is evidence of negligence and vice versa.
Factors which one jurisdiction uses to establish bad faith, another will use to
substantiate negligence. Thus, the insurer's refusal to settle would tend to render
it liable under either test, where the evidence as to liability was strongly against
the insured;' 8 where the insurer failed to investigate the facts so as to be able
honestly and intelligently to evaluate the possibilities; 19 where the insurer failed
to heed the advice of its own attorneys to settle; 20 where insurer persisted in its
refusal to accept a proposed settlement even after a judgment against insured as
to liability was first obtained; 21 or where the insurer failed to inform the insured
of the settlement offer. 22 As a result there has, at times, been a merger of the
two standards. 23 In Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co.,2 4 it was noted that
efforts to maintain a distinction between due care and good faith, lead to "tauto-
logical confusion." There the dual standard was applied to require not only good
faith as to the decision by the insurer regarding settlement, but also to require
due care in the investigation leading to such decision.25
Relying on the Hilker case, the court in the instant case maintained"... that
the two rules are on their way to an amalgam, and that the real question which
confronts courts in cases such as the one at bar cannot be solved merely by rede-
fining either good faith or due care."2 6 The court reached a synthesis of the
salient features of the good faith and negligence rules. To give the insured the
protection he bargained for, the company's decision regarding the settlement offer
17. Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers' Indemnity Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60
N.E.2d 896 (1945).
18. Noshey v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934) (good faith);
Mendota Electric Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 169 Minn. 377, 211 N.W. 317 (1926),
later approved, 175 Minn. 181, 221 N.W. 61 (1928) (negligence).
19. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
289 U.S. 736 (1933) (good faith); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wyoming Valley Paper Co., 84
F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1936) (negligence).
20. Royal Transit v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.) cert. denied,
335 U.S. 844 (1948) (good faith) ; Attleboro Mfg. C. v. Frankfort Marine, Acc. & Plate Glass
Ins. Co., 240 F. 573 (1st Cir. 1917) (negligence).
21. Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935) (good faith);
Anderson v. Southern Surety Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191 Pac. 583 (1920) (negligence).
22. Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931) (good
faith); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wyoming Valley Paper Co., 84 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1936) (neg-
ligence). Leading legal periodicals are agreed that the distinction between the "bad faith
rule" and the "negligence rule" is less marked than the terms would suggest. See Keeton,
supra note 6 at 1140-41; Comment, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 95, 100 (1949); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d
168, 171 (1955); Comment, 18 Mo. L. Rev. 192, 194 (1953); Note, 45 111. L. Rev. 516,
519 (1950).
23. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 171 (1955).
24. 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
25. See also Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir.
1942); Lawson & Nelson S. & D. Co. v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 204 Minn. 50, 282 N.W.
481 (1938) ; Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935) ; South-
ern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952); Hazelrigg v.
American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 238 F.2d 953 (1956).
26. 298 P.2d at 1018.
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must be honest and intelligent, if it be considered as made in good faith; and
only a decision made by one who exercised due care in ascertaining the material
facts may be said to have been made in good faith. While the insurer obviously has
a right to give heed to its own interests, it must give at least as much attention to
those of the insured, informing him of settlement offers " . ..so that the
insured may take whatever course may be necessary for the protection of his own
interests in the event the insurer rejects the offer." 27
In cases where the evidence is fairly well balanced, the rule charged to the
jury might well determine the jury's decision. It has been found that in juris-
dictions employing the good faith rule, the jury more often favored the insurer,
possibly thinking it necessary to find direct evidence of bad faith; while in the
jurisdictions applying the negligence rule, the interests of the insured were more
often favored, undoubtedly because the claimant's victory was equated with
the insurer's negligence in making its decision to litigate. A charge utilizing both
tests might produce more equitable results.
It is, however, agreed by most authorities that the real difficulty lies not in the
charge to the jury but in the jury's inability to comprehend the problem fully.23
It has been proposed that the question be handled as one of law, whenever
possible;29 that the insurer be required by the policy to pay the full amount of
any judgment rendered subsequent to a refusal to accept an offer of settlement
below the maximum coverage of the policy,O or that the insurer be liable for
double the amount of the policy should he elect to defend.31 It is quite certain
that changes such as these will come only from the legislatures. In the absence
of legislation the instant case goes as far as is possible within the limits of the
typical insurance policy to safeguard the interests of the insured and give him
the protection for which he contracted.
Joint Tortfeasors - New York Civil Practice Act - Effect of Section
530(4) on the Rights of a Judgment Creditor Against Other Joint Tort-
feasors.-Plaintiff, injured in a fall on a stairway, brought an action against
the landlord for violation of a statutory duty and against the tenant who con-
trolled the stairway. The complaint against the landlord was dismissed but plain-
tiff recovered a judgment against the tenant. The Appellate Division affirmed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against the tenant, but reversed
27. 298 P.2d at 1024. Here, the court went beyond the Hilker decision, since in that
case the court seemed to indicate that the Company may give its orn interests paramount
consideration.
28. Appleman is convinced that justice will never be served so long as the question is left
to a jury's determination, due to the jury's lack of qualification and experience to fully
appreciate and consider the problem. Appleman, supra note 2, at 109. For discussion of
the problem see: Note 13, Chi. L. Rev. 105 (1945) ; Comment, 43 Mlich. L. Rev. 9S (1949);
Note, 45 Il. L. Rev. 516 (1950).
29. Appleman, supra note 2, at 107.
30. Note, 60 Yale L. J. 1037 (1951); Comment 43 Mich. L. Rev. 95 (1949); Note, 13
Chi. L. Rev. 105 (1945).
31. Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Mliss. Central R.R. Co., 116 Miss. 114, 76 So. 646 (1917).
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and granted a new trial as to the landlord. The tenant, pursuant to section
530(4) of the Civil Practice Act, then deposited the amount of the judgment
with the court clerk. The landlord pleaded the tenant's deposit as a satisfaction
of the judgment and as a bar to any further action. The Supreme Court dis-
missed the answer on the ground that an involuntary satisfaction of judgment
against one joint tortfeasor does not constitute a bar to an action by the injured
party against the other tortfeasor. On appeal to the Appellate Division, held,
two justices dissenting, reversed. The deposit with the court clerk by the judg-
ment debtor, if not collusive, satisfies the judgment, extinguishes the cause of
action and may be pleaded by a joint tortfeasor as a bar to a subsequent action
based on the same injury. De Casiano v. Morgan, 1 A.D. 2d 646, 153 N.Y.S.
2d 295 (lst Dep't 1956).
A party who has been injured by the wrong of joint tortfeasors may sue and
recover judgments against either or all in several actions, but he may have but
one satisfaction.' The injured party may take his choice of the best damages.-
Satisfaction of judgment against the joint tortfeasor bars an action against his
fellow tortfeasor 3 and releases any judgment then docketed against the second
tortfeasor.4 It has been held that the satisfaction of a prior judgment, in order
to act as a discharge of other joint tortfeasors and bar subsequent action by the
injured party, must have been voluntarily accepted by the injured party.5 It has,
1. "It is elementary law that one who has been injured by the joint wrong of several
parties may recover his damages against either or all; but although there may be several
suits and recoveries, there can be but one satisfaction." Walsh v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R.R., 204
N.Y. 58, 62, 97 N.E. 408, 410 (1912). See Blann v. Crocheron, 19 Ala. 647 (1851);
Putney v. O'Brien, 53 Iowa 117, 4 N.W. 891 (1880); Bryant v. Reed, 34 Neb. 720, 52 N.V.
694 (1892).
2. Power v. Baker, 27 Fed. 396 (C.C. Minn. 1886); Kirchner v. New York, 223 App.
Div. 543, 228 N.Y. Supp. 718 (3d Dep't 1928); Putney v. O'Brien, supra note 1.
3. Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1, 17 (1865); Bryant v. Reed, 34 Neb. 720,
52 N.W. 694 (1802); Gray v. Fogarty, 237 App. Div. 855, 261 N.Y. Supp. 842 (2d Dep't
1932); Reno v. Thompson, 111 App. Div. 316, 97 N.Y. Supp. 744 (2d Dep't 1906); 34
C.J., Judgments § 1404 (1924).
4. Power v. Baker, 27 Fed. 396 (C.C. Minn. 1886); Putney v. O'Brien, 53 Iowa 117, 4
N.W. 891 (1880); Lord v. Tiffany, 98 N.Y. 412, 421 (1885); Knickerbacker v. Colver, 8
Cow. 111 (N.Y. 1828); Breslin v. Peck, 38 Hun 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1886); Morse v. Modern
Woodmen, 166 Wis. 194, 164 N.W. 829 (1917); 34 C.J., Judgments § 1404 (1924).
5. ". . . [T]he satisfaction which the law says shall bar further recovery [against a
joint tortfeasor] must be such as shall be voluntarily accepted by the plaintiff. Otherwise,
one joint wrongdoer, or all of them acting in concert through the one, or the [court] clerk,
might in fact exercise the election which the law says the plaintiff has the right to make, and
thus defeat the very object of the rule giving the plaintiff the right to maintain separate
actions, and to prosecute them to final judgments." McDonald v. Nugen, 118 Iowa 512, 92
N.W. 675 (1902). See Power v. Baker, 27 Fed. 396 (C.C. Minn. 1886); Huey v. Dykes,
203 Ala. 231, 82 So. 481 (1919) ; Blann v. Crocheron, 20 Ala. 320 (1852) ; Barrett v. Third
Ave. R. R. Co., 45 N.Y. 628, 635 (1871); Morse v. Modern Woodmen, 166 Wis. 194, 164
N.W. 829 (1917); 2 Freeman, Judgments § 578 (5th Ed. 1925); Annot., 27 A.L.R. 805,
810 (1923).
See the Supreme Court decision which was reversed by the present decision, which stated:
"The principle underlying the authorities is that, to constitute a defense, the discharge of the
therefore, been said that the deposit with the court clerk of the amount of a
judgment against one joint tortfeasor is not a satisfaction of the judgment which
will bar an action by the injured party against another joint tortfeasorO but
merely a" . . .satisfaction of a judgment of record." 7 This gives the judgment
debtor the benefit of his own voluntary action by precluding the injured party
from bringing further proceedings against him and also discourages collusion
among joint tortfeasors.
However, section 530(4) of the Civil Practice Act provides, "In the absence
of a satisfaction-piece under any of the foregoing provisions of this section, the
docket of a judgment must be cancelled, satisfied and discharged, by the clerk
in whose office the judgment-roll is filed, at any time, if the judgment debtor or
his legal representatives or any person shall deposit with such clerk a sum
of money equal to the amount of the judgment. . . . " Only two reported
decisions have construed section 530(4) with respect to a deposit in court by a
joint tortfeasor. Collins v. Smith8 held that a deposit with the court clerk of the
amount of a judgment against one joint fortfeasor by him is a satisfaction of
the judgment which will bar an action by the injured party against another joint
tortfeasor whether the injured party acquiesced or not.0 That was followed a year
later in Sarine v. American Lumberman's Miut. Cas. Co.10
The dissenting opinion in Collins v. Smith" argued that the deposit with the
court clerk by the joint tortfeasor judgment debtor" . ..was merely a public
record satisfaction pursuant to subdivision 4 of section 530 of the Civil Practice
Act. . . .The provisions of section 232 of the Debtor and Creditor Law,- prevent
the discharge of the other defendant."' 3 This construction of section 530(4)
protects the judgment debtor without diminishing the rights of the injured party.
In the instant case, the court, relying on the Collins case, reasoned that the
deposit of the amount of the judgment in court by the judgment debtor was a bar
right of action, whether in the form of an accord and satisfaction or a release, must be the
'voluntary act' of the person injured; the satisfaction must have been voluntarily made and
accepted, and the release must have been voluntarily given and accepted." DeCaslano v.
Morgan, 135 N.Y.L.J. No. 45, p. 7, col 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. far. 7, 1956).
6. Power v. Baker, supra note 5; Huey v. Dykes, supra note 5; Blann v. Crocheron,
supra note 5; McDonald v. Nugen, supra note 5; Skelly Oil Co. v. Jordan, 1S6 0ka. 130,
96 P.2d 524 (1939); Morse v. Modern Woodmen, supra note 5 (especially co when the
plaintiff's right to appeal has not yet expired); Restatement, Judgments § 95, comment d
(1942).
7. Power v. Baker, 27 Fed. 396 (C.C. Mlinn. 1836); McDonald v. Nugen, 118 Iowa 512,
92 N.W. 675 (1902).
8. 255 App. Div. 665, 8 N.Y.S.2d 794 (2d Dep't 1939).
9. Ibid.
10. 258 App. Div. 653, 17 N.Y.S.2d 754 (2d Dep't 1940).
11. 255 App. Div. 665, 666, 8 N.Y1S.2d 794, 795 (2d Dep't 1939).
12. "A judgment against one or more of several obligors ... --hall not discharge a co-
obligor who was not a party to the proceeding wherein the judgment was rendered!' N.Y.
Debtor and Creditor Law § 232. The term "obligor" includes a person liable for a tort.
N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law § 231.
13. See Note 11 supra.
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to a subsequent action " . . . if . ..not collusive."14 However, the statute
requires the clerk to cancel and satisfy the judgment if the " . . . judgment
debtor ... or any other person . . . "15 deposits the amount of the judgment
with the court clerk. Since the statute permits anyone, including a joint tort-
feasor to pay the amount of a judgment into court it is not clear what would
constitute collusion. Why condemn as collusive that which may be done directly
merely because it is done indirectly?
The court stated that to hold that the deposit was not a satisfaction which
would bar the action would be to permit the plaintiff to recover double damages.
Such a view confuses the entry of judgment with its satisfaction. The plaintiff may
pursue only one of his two judgments to satisfaction. Were the plaintiff to
execute his second judgment, the depositor would recover his deposit from the
court clerk.
The major difficulty with the court's interpretation of section 530(4) is that
it denies plaintiff's right to prosecute joint tortfeasors in separate actions
to separate judgments and elect which to enforce, and confers this election upon
the tortfeasors.
Those jurisdictions,' 6 in accord with the position of the Restatement,17 hold-
ing payment into court by a joint tortfeasor as only a satisfaction of a judgment
of record enunciate the sounder doctrine. The judgment debtor is thereby
protected from harassment without a diminution of the plaintiff's rights. New
York has chosen to espouse a minority course of questionable validity.
Labor Law - Labor Management Relations Act - Effect of Noncom-
pliance with Filing Requirements on a Union's Right to Engage in Con-
certed Activities.-Petitioner, representing the majority of employees of
respondent, had failed to file financial or organizational data and non-Communist
affidavits in compliance with the Labor Management Relations Act. The em-
ployees, as a means of inducing their employer to recognize the union, struck
and set up a picket line. The Supreme Court of Louisiana sustained a lower
court's injunction against the picketing, holding that the union by failing to
comply with the filing requirements of the federal act had lost all right
to bargain with the employer, and the Louisiana court could enjoin the non-
complying union from picketing in violation of its laws. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, held, one justice dissenting, reversed. A union failing
to comply with the filing requirements is denied utilization of the processes
of the National Labor Relations Board, but has the right to strike and peace-
14. De Casiano v. Morgan, 1 A.D.2d 646, 647, 153 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (1st Dep't
1956).
15. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 530(4). (Emphasis added).
16. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
17. ". . . [A] payment into court of the amount of the judgment by a judgment debtor
without the consent of the judgment creditor does not terminate the claim against other
persons liable for the same harm." Restatement, Judgments § 95, comment d (1942). Sec
also Restatement, Torts § 886 comment c (1939).
fully picket. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oah Flooring Co., 350 U.S.
860 (1956).
Since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,1 the line of demarcation
between federal and state jurisdiction in the field of labor law has been vaguely
drawn. It is clear that the states are precluded from interfering with or re-
straining the free exercise of rights granted by federal labor legislation,2 and
may not enjoin under their laws conduct sanctioned by federal law.3 However,
the problem of jurisdiction arises in instances where the act neither specifies
rights nor prohibits activity. In the case of Webcr v. Anhcescr-Busc , In:c. 4
the Supreme Court attempted to delineate between federal and state authority.
However, it is not yet perspicuous, and the " . . . penumbral area can be
rendered progressively clear only by the course of litigation."3
.Subdivisions (f), (g), and (h) of section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act
provide for the filing of non-Communist affidavits and financial data by union
officials, and deny utilization of the machinery of the National Labor Re-
lations Board to any union that does not do so.7
Originally, the lower federal courts held that an employer was under no
obligation to bargain with a union whose officers had failed to file as required
by the act s but since the act did not proscribe bargaining with a noncomplying
union, he could voluntarily recognize such a labor organization as a collective
bargaining agent.9 This view has subsequently been rejected and an employer
has the duty to bargain with a noncomplying union. 10
While the act clearly provides that compliance with the requirements of
section 9 (f), (g), and (h) is a condition precedent to use of the machinery
of the Board,' the jurisdiction of the Board does not hinge on any such con-
tingency.'2 To hold the contrary would encourage noncompliance and defeat
the purpose of the legislature since the obligations imposed by the act could be
readily evaded. Thus, the Board has the right to take decertification proceed-
1. 29 U.S.CA. §§ 141-SS (1956).
2. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340
U.S. 383 (1951); International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Hill v. Florida, 325
US. 533 (1945).
3. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 48 (1953).
4. 34S U.S. 468 (1955).
5. Id. at 480-81.
6. 29 U.S.CA. § 159 (f)-(h) (1956).
7. National Maritime Union, 78 NL.R.B. 971, 987-88 (1948).
8. NLRB v. Tennessee Egg Co., 199 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1952); Andrews Cae, 87
N.L.RB. 379 (1949).
9. NLRB v. Pratt, Reed & Co, 191 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1951).
10. NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Tennessee
Egg Co., 201 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1953); West Teas Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 134 F.2d 233
(D.C. Cir. 1950).
11. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 133-34 (1953).
12. In NLRB v. Dant, 344 U.S. 375 (1953), the court held that a union which is late
in meeting the Ming requirements of the act is not denied access to the proceczes of the
National Labor Relations Board.
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ings against a noncomplying union,13 to decide whether a noncomplying union
does in fact represent the majority of employees,14 and to determine and take
appropriate action if a noncomplying union is indulging in unfair labor
practices.15
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia'0 and the National Labor
Relations Board17 have held that while a noncomplying union is precluded from
utilization of the Board, the sections involved do not strip such a union of its
right to engage in concerted activities. The court, in the instant case, in reaching
the same conclusion is on firm ground. Congress was aware when framing the
act that certain rights, such as the right to strike or picket, would not involve
the invocation of the machinery of the Board. Therefore, in specifically limiting
the penalty for noncompliance to a denial of the services of the Board, it was
the intent of Congress that these fundamental rights be conferred on noncom-
plying unions.
In the dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that the filing provi-
sions of the act were designed to hamper nonconforming unions and deny them
rights considered essential to unions, thus eliminating Communist influences in
labor. However, he concluded that Congress never intended to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over noncomplying unions, but intended rather to subject such
unions to concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. Congress deemed otherwise,
and provided that the elimination of Communist influence be achieved by main-
taining exclusive control over noncomplying unions.
Torts - Respondeat Superior - Liability of Charitable Corporations for
Torts of Servants.-Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against a
charitable hospital, alleging that, while a paying patient, he was on two occasions
negligently permitted to fall from a hospital bed furnished by defendant. De-
fendant's answer stated that, as a charitable hospital, it was immune from suit.
Plaintiff's demurrer to the answer was denied by the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Ohio, held, two judges dissenting, judgment reversed. A charitable hospital
is liable for the torts of its servants under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
Over a century ago an English court wrote, as dictum, "To give damages out
of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the
fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose."'
In spite of the repudiation of this "trust fund" theory by subsequent English
13. Harris Foundry & Machine Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 118 (1948).
14. Ibid.
15. See note 7 supra.
16. West Texas Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 184 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
17. Brookville Glove Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 52 (1955); Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., 99
N.L.R.B. 610 (1952).
1. Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 507, 513, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508, 1510
(H.L. 1846).
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courts,2 it was adopted by Massachusetts in Mc Donald v. Massachusetts
General Hospital.3 With a precedent established, the doctrine of immunity of
charitable corporations gained prominent acceptance4 in this country although
divergent theories emerged to support it. Some jurisdictions predicated immunity
on the reasoning that the rule of respondeat superior does not apply to a chari-
table institution, the servants of such being considered servants of the public,
and not of a profit making master.0 But the master's profit played no part in the
development of the doctrine of respondeat superior; rather the commission
of the tort in the course of employment and the master's power to control the
servant set the rule in operation; and certainly the public at large possessed no
power to control the employee of a charitable organization. Other jurisdictions
predicated immunity on the "implied waiver" theory, viz., that a person who
willingly becomes a beneficiary of a charitable corporation impliedly waives all
tort claims arising by reason of the negligence of the charity's employees.0 Under
this reasoning, recovery is denied to non-paying patients, whereas paying patients,
invitees, or employees may recover. The waiver rule is a fiction; it is most
unrealistic and illogical to suggest that a patient who visits a hospital for treat-
ment consents to negligent treatment.
In 1942, in the case of Georgetown College v. Hughes,7 Mr. Justice Rutledge,
then of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, gave the immunity
doctrine and its underlying theories an exhaustive and analytical evaluation. The
Justice concluded that a charity should be responsible for its torts to the same
extent as any other defendant. Since the opinion in the Georgetow College case,
the trend has been towards a repudiation of the immunity doctrine.3
2. Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 1 H.I. 93, 11 Eng. Rep. 150 (H.L. 1S66); Foreman v.
Mayor, [18711 L.R. 6 Q.B. 214.
3. 120 Mass. 432 (1376); accord, Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt
Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 Atl. 301 (1917); Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 2S4,
75 Atl. 1037 (1910); Parks v. Northwestern, 21S Ill. 3S1, 75 N.E. 991 (1905); Williamson
v. Louisville Industrial School of Reform, 95 Ky. 251, 24 S.W. 1055 (1394).
4. Contra, Mulliner v. Evangelischer, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920); Tucker v.
Mobile Infirmary, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I.
411 (1879).
S. Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921); Morrison v.
Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1916); Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 93,
33 Ati. 595 (1895).
6. Cohen v. General Hospital Soc'y, 113 Conn. 183, 154 AU. 435 (1931); St. Vincent's
Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924); Weston's Adm's v. Ho-Tital of St.
Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921); Bruce v. Central M. E. Church, 147
Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907); Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Ho-pital, 10) Fcd.
294 (1st Cir. 1901).
7. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
8. Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); St. Luke's Hospital
Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952); Suwannee County Hospital Corp. v.
Golden, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952); Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P2d
220 (1952); Malloy v. Fong, 37 CaM.2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Durney v. St. Francis
Hospital, 83 A.2d 753 (1951); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45
N.W.2d 151 (1950); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A2d 230 (1950);
Richbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946).
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Prior to the instant case, a charitable hospital in Ohio was liable to benefi-
ciaries only when the hospital's negligence in the selection of employees was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.9 The majority opinion found that
the reasons of public policy on which the partial immunity was based no longer
existed.
Under prevalent social and economic conditions in this country, little justifi-
cation remains for the rule of immunity. Many of today's charitable institutions
have grown into efficient and adequately financed enterprises. Many charities
now enjoy endowments and resources which were rare when the rule first
emerged. In the case of hospitals, payment for services rendered has been
substantially guaranteed by the widespread development of hospitalization
insurance. Our tax laws have been written with a view to encourage charitable con-
tributions,10 and on the whole the assets of charitable corporations have been
left immune from income," real property,12 and other state taxation.' 3 Certainly
charities are no longer the indigent enterprises they once appeared to be. In
addition, the dissipation of the institution's assets may be circumscribed
by liability insurance, which is readily available without undue financial burden.
The dissenting opinion in the present case took the position that any change
in the immunity rule should come from the legislature. However, the policy
which fostered the immunity rule was of court creation and there is no compelling
reason why the court should wait for the legislature to change a value judgment
made by this same court. In all other jurisdictions where the prior existing rule
of immunity was reversed, it was accomplished through the courts, rather than
through legislative process.'
4
9. Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922);
Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
10. The Internal Revenue Code has as a general rule allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution, payment of which is made within the taxable year. Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
§ 170(a) (1).
11. The Internal Revenue Code provides that corporations, organized and operated
exclusively for charitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and which does
not participate in, or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for
public office are tax exempt. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501(c) (3).
12. The real property of charitable corporations has been rendered tax exempt by statute:
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 64-201(5) (1945); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 59, § 5(3) (1914); N.Y. Tax Law
§ 4(6); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 15.2(8) (1945); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, § 5020-204(c)
(1943).
13. The personal property of charitable corporations has been rendered tax exempt by
statute in jurisdictions in which personal property is subject to taxation: Ind. Stat. Ann.
§ 64-201(5) (1945) ; Mass. Ann. Laws c. 59, § 5(3) (1914) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 1S.2(8)
(1945).
14. See note 8 supra.
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Trade Regulation - Fair Trade - Due Process - Constitutionality of
Non-Signer Provision.-Plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, sold its trademarked
electrical appliances in interstate commerce. It maintained fair trade contracts
with numerous retailers in Kentucky. Defendants, non-contracting Kentucky
retailers who had knowledge of these contracts, sold plaintiff's products at less
than fair trade prices. Plaintiff brought this action, pursuant to the non-signer
provision of the Kentucky fair trade act, to enjoin defendants from selling at less
than the fair trade price. Held, complaint dismissed. Non-signer provisions of
the federal and state statutes violate the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution. Sunbeam Corp. v. Richardson, 144 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Ky. 1956).
Fair trade is a method of resale price maintenance, by which the manufacturer
of a trademarked product in free and open competition with other brands
establishes a minimum resale price at wholesale and retail levels. It is price
fixing in a vertical line, from manufacturer to distributor to retailer, as dis-
tinguished from horizontal price fixing whereby competitors at the same level
of distribution conspire to maintain a uniform price. Horizontal price fixing has
been uniformly condemned by court and legislature,' but the legality and con-
stitutionality of fair trade laws have generally been upheld.-"
The first important judicial decision on resale price maintenance predated the
legislative fair trade era. In the Dr. Miles Medical Co. case,3 decided in 1911,
a manufacturer of trademarked drugs sought to control the resale price by con-
tract. The Supreme Court found such contracts to be in violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act,4 holding that the manufacturer" . . . having sold its product
at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever advantage may be
derived from competition in the subsequent traffic.":; The effect of Dr. M1iles
during the next two decades was to make illegal any attempt by a manufacturer
to set resale prices for articles shipped in interstate commerce.
Because of the cut-throat competition during the depression of the 1930's,
many states enacted fair trade legislation,6' which legalized contracts setting
minimum resale prices. When these statutes proved ineffective, the non-signer
provision was added, which bound non-contracting parties who had knowledge
of a fair trade contract7 to sell at no less than the minimum resale price stipulated
in the contract.
1. See notes 4, 10, 14 infra. Also see Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (19I); A-o-
dated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co, 317
U.S. 173 (1942).
2. The highest courts for seventeen states have held fair trade constitutional under their
respective state constitutions. The highest courts for three states have held fair trade laws
unconstitutional, and five other states have declared the non-signer clause of their fair trade
laws unconstitutional.
3. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 US. 373 (1911).
4. 15 U.S.CA. §§ 1-7 (1951).
5. 220 U.S. at 403.
6. Only four jurisdictions, Missouri, Te.as, Vermont, and the District of Columbia have
not enacted fair trade laws.
7. Knowledge is transmitted to the wholesaler or retailer quite easily by a notice from
the manufacturer, either by mail or newspaper advertisement.
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In 1936 the constitutionality of these state laws was challenged before the
Supreme Court in the Old Dearborn case.8 An Illinois fair trade statute was
attacked on the grounds that it violated the due process9 and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and that it was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power to private persons. The Court held these arguments without
merit, and decided that the state fair trade act, including the non-signer pro-
vision, was constitutional.
Old Dearborn had settled the constitutionality of the state fair trade laws, but
the question of their applicability to interstate commerce was still to be de-
termined. In 1937 Congress enacted the Miller-Tydings Amendment 10 to the
Sherman Act. It provided that fair trade contracts which had been lawful within
the states would henceforth be lawful in interstate commerce. It was believed
that this amendment conferred a blanket immunity on the state fair trade laws,"
but in 1951 the Supreme Court, in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp.,12 adopted a literal interpretation of Miller-Tydings and ruled that it did
not exempt non-signer provisions from the sanctions of the Sherman Act.1
Congress reversed the effect of the Schwegmann case almost immediately. In
1952 it enacted the McGuire Act,14 which provided that nothing in the federal
anti-trust laws would render the state non-signer provisions unlawful when
applied to interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has not as yet passed
on the constitutionality of the McGuire Act.
In the instant case the court declared the non-signer provisions of both the
McGuire Act and the Kentucky fair trade statute unconstitutional, holding that
legislation which imposed limited ownership in the absence of contract was a
deprivation of a property right without due process of law, and that the non-
signer laws were an unlawful delegation of legislative power to private indi-
viduals. In Old Dearborn the Supreme Court considered these arguments without
merit. The court in the instant case, in an attempt to evade the controlling
authority of Old Dearborn, asserted that the Supreme Court's holding applied
only to contracting parties and not to non-signers. But Old Dearborn was
squarely in point on the non-signer issue, since the Court there found it un-
necessary to determine whether or not there was a contract, holding that in the
absence of contract defendant would still be liable under the non-signer clause.
Having by-passed Old Dearborn, the court in the instant case seized upon a
dictum in the Schwegmann case, which referred to the non-signer clause
8. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
9. ". . . [T]he guaranty of due process . . .demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and sub-
stantial relation to the object sought to be obtained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
525 (1934).
10. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951).
11. See Pepsodent v. Krauss, 56 F. Supp. 922 (D.C. La. 1944).
12. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
13. The court held that Miller-Tydings granted only " . . a limited immunity-a limita-
tion that is further emphasized by the inclusion in the state law and the exclusion from the
federal law of the non-signer provision." Id. at 388.
14. 15 U.S.CA. § 45(a) (Supp. 1955).
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as "a resort to coercion" and as "price-fixing by compulsion",' 3 as sufficient
evidence of the Supreme Court's disapproval. The error of such a position is that
the Court was speaking of non-signer's legality under the Sherman Act and not
of its constitutionality. Subsequently the McGuire Act removed the non-signer
clause from the sanctions of the Sherman Act, so that the Court's dictum in
Schwegmann has no application to a constitutional issue at all. This was clearly
pointed out in the Eli Lilly case,' where under an almost identical set of facts
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the McGuire Act constitutional.
There the court said that " . . . there is no implication in Schwegmann that
Congressional approval of enforcement against non-signers would be unconstitu-
tional, the implications are to the contrary."' 7 The Court of Appeals recognized
the authority of Old Dearborn and felt compelled to follow it.
The present court charged that non-signer legislation constituted a denial of
due process. Old Dearborn stated that non-signer was not" . . . so arbitrary,
unfair or wanting in reason as to result in a denial of due process."'u The present
court said that the non-signer provision was" . . . for the benefit of the man-
ufacturer and not for the benefit of the whole people of the state."'1 The Old
Dearborn Court heard this same argument, but concluded that" . . . where the
question of what the facts establish is a fairly debatable one, we accept and
carry into effect the opinion of the legislature."20 The general policy of
the Supreme Court is to support legislative enactments whenever possible,
. . . unless palpably in excess of legislative power." 2'
The court in the instant case also charged that the non-signer provision created
an unlawful delegation of legislative power, since it provided no legal standards
by which fair trade prices were to be regulated, but rather had left it to the
" . ..arbitrary judgment or whim of the manufacturer.u2 - However, both
the Miller-Tydings Amendment and the McGuire Act provide that the fair trade
product must be " . . . in fair and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced by others."'2 3 Obviously the intent of Congress was
that the economic pressure exerted by a freely competitive market would con-
stitute sufficient restraint over a fair trade manufacturer and force him to main-
tain a reasonable price. It seems probable that the Supreme Court will not debate
the effectiveness of the standards chosen by Congress. The Court has already
stated that, "only if we could say that there is an absence of standards . . . , so
15. 341 US. at 38S.
16. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegnann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 109 F. Supp. 269 (E.D.
La.), aff'd, 205 F.2d 7S8 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953).
17. 205 F.2d at 791.
1. 299 US. at 194.
19. 144 F. Supp. at 590.
20. 299 U.S. at 196.
21. "... [Tlhe legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of such an enactment,
that every possible presumption is in favor of its validity, and that though the court may
hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled unllez palpably
in excess of legislative power." 291 US. at 537.
22. 144 F. Supp. at 591.
23. See notes 10, 14 supra.
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that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will
of Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of
means for effecting its declared purpose .... "24 In brief, it seems unlikely
that the Supreme Court will accept the reasoning of the present case.
Wills - Right of Election - Surviving Spouse's Absolute Right of Election
Against a Will Which in Form Granted the Equivalent of Intestate Share
in Trust.-Testator created three trusts by his will. The first two gave the
income to two children during the minority of each and named the same children
as remaindermen of all three. The third gave the income to testator's widow for
life with the principal at her death to be added equally to the children's trusts or, if
the children had reached majority, to be given to the children free of trust.
The estate consisted of stock in six wholly owned corporations. The will per-
mitted retention or sale of the securities by the trustee, but, upon sale, restricted
reinvestment to United States government bonds. In this action the widow
requested determination of the validity of her notice to elect to take her intestate
share against the will. The Surrogate's Court denied her a right of election.
The Appellate Division found the trust for the widow to be illusory and re-
versed. On appeal, held, two judges dissenting, right of election denied. The
danger that the trust would become unproductive of real income because of
misconduct by the trustee or corporate directors does not create or permit a right
of election where the testator left his wife a fair and equitable share of his estate
which is at least equivalent to her intestate share in trust. Matter ol Shupack,
1 N.Y. 2d 482, 136 N.E. 2d 513 (1956).
Many states have abolished dower,1 some have abolished curtesy,2 and, in
such cases, other provisions have been substituted therefor. New York in 1930
abolished the wife's inchoate right of dower3 and the husband's estate by the
curtesy.4 In place thereof a personal right of election was granted to the sur-
viving spouse to take his or her share as in intestacy, subject to certain limita-
tions, conditions, and exceptions.5 One such exception eliminates the right of
election where the testator makes an absolute legacy or devise of at least $2,500
24. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). Also see Carolene Products Co.
v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31 (1944). "When Congress exercises a delegated power such
as that over interstate commerce, the methods which it employs to carry out its purposes
are beyond attack without a clear and convincing showing that there is no rational basis of
the legislation; that it is an arbitrary fiat."
1. Bunker v. Bunker, 130 Me. 103, 154 AtI. 73 (1931) ; State ex rel. Pettit v. Probate
Ct., 137 Minn. 238, 163 N.W. 285 (1917); Brown's Appeal, 72 Conn. 148, 44 At. 22 (1899);
Haggerty v. Wagner, 148 Ind. 625, 48 N.E. 366 (1897); 17 Am. Jur., Dower § 11 (1938).
2. Ketterer v. Nelson, 146 Ky. 7, 141 S.W. 409 (1911) ; Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367,
94 Pac. 360 (1908) ; Jackson v. Jackson, 144 Il. 274, 33 N.E. 51 (1893) ; Todd v. Oviatt, 58
Conn. 174, 20 Atl. 440 (1889); 15 Am. Jur., Curtesy § 5 (1938).
3. N.Y. Real Property Law § 190.
4. Id. § 189.
5. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 18(1).
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to the surviving spouse and also places in trust for his or her benefit for life
an amount equal to his or her intestate share less the amount of the absolute
legacy or devise.6 When the legislature passed these provisions its e-pressed
intention was " . . . to increase the share of a surviving spouse in the state of
a deceased spouse, either in a case of intestacy or by an election against the
terms of the will of the deceased spouse thus enlarging property rights of such
surviving spouse .. . ", and it was stated that " . . . such provisions shal
be liberally construed to carry out such intention."7
An absolutes right of election has been granted as against an "illusory" trust
even where the testator has given a life trust to the surviving spouse in an
amount at least equivalent to his or her intestate share. Such is the case when,
by the terms of the will, an invasion of the principal for the benefit of parties
other than the surviving spouse was permitted, or when, by the terms of the
will, possibly unfruitful assets could be prevented from becoming fruitful
in the sole discretion of a party or parties other than the beneficiary.10 The
language used by the courts in these and similar cases suggests that whether
an absolute right of election should be granted depends upon whether the surviv-
ing spouse receives a substantial trust equivalent of his or her intestate share."'
In the instant case, that which the surviving spouse was granted in trust
coupled with the outright legacy constituted more than her intestate share.'2
However, the portion held in trust for her benefit consisted of corporate stock
whose actual productivity could be effectively reduced or eliminated during
her lifetime by the testator's two children who would become majority stock-
holders in the corporations upon reaching their majority. As controlling stock-
holders the children would have power to elect directors who might in turn
be motivated to retain corporate earnings in the corporate treasury so as to
6. Id. § 1S(1)(d).
7. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 20.
8. "Absolute" is used as opposed to the "limited" right of election granted where the
testator gives less than $2,500 outright but an amount in trust, or in trust plus outright, at
least equivalent to the intestate share. In such a case, the surviving spouse has the 'limited"
right of election to have an amount deducted from the principal of the trust sufilcient to
grant him or her $2400 outright while the balance is retained in trust. N.Y. Decedent
Estate Law § 18(1) (e).
9. Matter of Wittner, 301 N.Y. 461, 95 N.E.2d 793 (1950); Matter of Mfatthews, 255
App. Div. 80, 5 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2d Dep't 1933), afi'd, 279 N.Y. 732, 18 N.E.2d 693 (1939).
10. Matter of Schrouth, 249 App. Div. 846, 292 N.Y. Supp. 923 (2d Dep't 1937); hfatter
of Curley, 245 App. Div. 255, 280 N.Y. Supp. 80 (2d Dep't 1935), aff'd, 269 N.Y. 543, 199
N.E. 665 (1935).
11. It is a ... well-recognized doctrine that section 18 must be liberally construed In
favor of the surviving spouse in order to fulfill 'the evident purpose of the Leilature that
a surviving spouse should retain the right to claim his or her full intestate share, in spite
of any will, unless the instrument should provide substantial equivalents?" Matter of
Wittner, 301 N.Y. 461, 95 N.E.2d 798 (1950). See also Matter of Eddy, 173 Mic. 723,
13 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Surr. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 860, 15 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1st Dep't
1939), aft'd, 283 N.Y. 556, 27 N.E.2d 279 (1940); Matter of Bommer, 159 Misc. S11, 283
N.Y. Supp. 419 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Matter of Byrnes, 260 N.Y. 465, 184 N.E. 56 (1933).
12. The intestate share of a surviving spouse where children also survive the decedent
amounts to one-third of the estate. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 83(1).
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increase the value of the shares which would ultimately come to the children
as remaindermen. A showing of fraud, bad faith, dishonesty, or a clear abuse
of discretion is necessary to overcome a director's discretion in the matter of
declaring dividends.13
The majority opinion stressed the point that the character of the testator's
property is the source of the widow's complaint rather than any attempt on the
part of the testator to deprive her of her rightful share in his estate. It did not
comment upon the fact that the eventual majority holders of the corporate stock
were also remaindermen of the wife's trust principal. The majority simply held
that the danger of misconduct by trustees or corporate directors managing the
property did not create or permit a right of election.
The dissenting opinion based its reasoning upon the nature of the dual status
of the children as both remaindermen of the wife's trust and eventual majority
holders of the corporate stock. From this dual status there arises what the
dissent termed "potentially antagonistic interests".
Hoarding corporate earnings by withholding dividends, however, also causes
trust assets to become unproductive. When trust assets become unproductive,
the trustee is placed under a duty to sell them and reinvest the proceeds. 14 The
same duty would probably fall upon the trustee if the trust produced sub-
stantially less income than the ordinary rate of return on trust investments.10
A sale by the trustee of these corporate shares eliminates the children's power
to increase the value of their remainder. The likelihood that a sale of this
minority interest would bring less than its true equity value further reduces the
potential value of their remainder. Thus, while these "potentially antagonistic
interests" might still provide a motive for reducing the amount of dividends
declared to a point just short of placing a duty to sell upon the trustee, they
would hardly provide a motive for very drastically reducing the widow's income
since such action ultimately would adversely affect the children's own interests.
Though the widow is not assured an income commensurate with the productivity
rate which the testator was able to realize on the assets, she is at least assured
an income not substantially less than that ordinarily derived from trust invest-
ments or, in the event of sale of the corporate stock by the trustee, an income
on the return from reinvestment in United States government bonds.
Since the provisions of the present will did not permit invasion of the trust
principal nor allow the assets to remain unfruitful, the precedents cited in the
dissenting opinion are not controlling. There is adequate assurance that
the widow will receive a fair return on her interest in the trust. There are
remedies available to her to implement that assurance.10 This being so, it would
be unreasonable to call the trust "illusory" or to say that she did not receive
the substantial equivalent of her intestate share.
13. See Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E.2d 331 (1954).
14. Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951); Restatement, Trusts § 240;
2 Scott, Trust § 240 (1939).
15. Restatement, Trusts § 240; 2 Scott, Trusts § 240 (1939). Although Matter of Hub-
bell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951), dealt only with totally unproductive assets, the
fact that the above authorities were cited suggests that the entire wording of these sections
would be followed in New York.
16. See Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951).
